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Existing growth research provides little explanation for the very large differences in long-run 
growth performance across OECD countries. We show that cognitive skills can account for 
growth differences within the OECD, whereas a range of economic institutions and 
quantitative measures of tertiary education cannot. Under the growth model estimates and 
plausible projection parameters, school improvements falling within currently observed 
performance levels yield very large gains. The present value of OECD aggregate gains 
through 2090 could be as much as $275 trillion, or 13.8 percent of the discounted value of 
future GDP. Extensive sensitivity analyses indicate that, while differences between model 
frameworks and alternative parameter choices make a difference, the economic impact of 
improved educational outcomes remains enormous. Interestingly, the quantitative difference 
between an endogenous and neoclassical model framework – with improved skills affecting 
the long-run growth rate versus just the steady-state income level – matters less than academic 
discussions suggest. We close by discussing evidence on which education policy reforms may 
be able to bring about the simulated improvements in educational outcomes. 
JEL-Code: I20, O40. 
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How much do educational 
outcomes matter in OECD 
countries?
* 
Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann 
Hoover Institution, Stanford University, NBER and CESifo; University of Munich, Ifo Institute 
for Economic Research, CESifo and IZA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite its surge over the past two decades, research in the economics of growth – 
both theoretical and empirical – has produced surprisingly few resilient results about 
policies that might promote long-run growth in developed countries (cf. Aghion and 
Howitt (2006)).  Most of the robust results that exist refer either to the importance of 
basic economic institutions, with important policy implications for developing countries, 
or to policies that affect short- to medium-term growth in developed countries.  Here we 
present evidence that improved human capital, measured by cognitive skills, has the 
potential for substantial improvements in the long-run economic well-being of OECD 
countries. 
The immense variation in the long-run growth experiences of developed countries has 
largely escaped notice.  For example, from 1960 to 2000, GDP per capita grew by less 
than 1.5 percent on average per year in New Zealand and Switzerland, but by more than 
4 percent per year in Ireland, Japan, and South Korea.  As a consequence, the average 
Korean was about 10 times as well off in 2000 as in 1960, and the average Irish and 
Japanese about 5 times.  By contrast, the average New Zealander and Swiss was only 
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1.6-1.8 times as well off than 40 years before.  These stark differences are directly 
visible when comparing the three fastest-growing and the three slowest-growing 
countries highlighted (together with the US) in Figure 1, which plots GDP per capita in 
1960 and 2000:  Korea surpassed several other OECD countries, including Mexico; 
Japan and Ireland went from 40-45 percent to 131-140 percent of New Zealand’s 
income; and Ireland caught up to Switzerland from an initial level of 35 percent of its 
GDP per capita.  
This paper focuses on these long-run growth differences among OECD countries.  Our 
results show that educational outcomes play a leading role in their understanding, and we 
estimate how much improvements in educational outcomes could matter for developed 
economies.  The paper builds on existing growth analyses that focus attention on 
cognitive skills, as opposed to the more commonly measured school attainment or years 
of school completed (see Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) for a review).  But while 
much of the existing analysis is focused on developing countries and their difference 
from developed countries, here we focus on whether cognitive skills also matter in 
understanding growth differences among rich countries. 
The basis of assessment of the role of human capital is a series of cross-country growth 
regressions that characterize variations in growth rates between 1960 and 2000.  Our 
analysis of growth differences relies largely on the 24 OECD countries with consistent 
data on cognitive skills and economic growth across the period, although we also 
provide some relevant comparisons with the expanded sample of 50 countries that 
incorporates non-OECD countries.
1  Section 2 provides the basic estimates of growth 
models along with investigation of the sensitivity of the results to sample, model 
specification, and the like.  The clear result is that richer measures of human capital 
based on international math and science tests dramatically increase the ability of the 
statistical models to explain growth differences across OECD countries.  Moreover, the 
estimated relationship is generally impervious to altered specifications of the model. 
Perhaps the leading candidate for being a more fundamental explanation of growth is 
the quality of a country’s economic institutions such as having secure property rights or 
an open economy.  This idea – most fully developed by Daron Acemoglu and his co-
authors – does not, however, have clear application in OECD countries where there is 
limited variation in these broad institutions (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 
(2001, 2005)).  Beyond these, considerable attention has been given to variations across 
the OECD in regulations of labor and product markets, bureaucratic burdens, and the 
like (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003); Nicoletti and Pryor (2006)).  The empirical 
application has, however, mostly addressed short-term growth effects at the industry 
level within countries.   
Section 3 provides new evidence on the role of various economic institutions in 
growth.  While property-rights and free-trade institutions have been shown to contribute 
to differences in long-run growth between rich and poor countries, and while labor- and 
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product-market regulations have been shown to contribute to differences in short-run 
growth among rich countries, we show that neither set of institutions helps us understand 
differences in long-run growth rates within the group of OECD countries.   
In part, this analysis also enters into the debates about the relative importance of 
institutions and human capital as stressed by Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2004).  Our results strongly favor cognitive skills, our measure of human 
capital, over institutions as a fundamental source of OECD-country growth differences.  
While cognitive skills can be developed in a variety of ways, we focus on some 
fundamental questions about school policy.  Educational policy differs considerably by 
country, with different countries pursuing very different investment approaches.  At one 
level, it is seen in very different levels of tertiary education.  For example, while 
Australia currently has 86 percent of a cohort entering tertiary education, Norway has 66 
percent, and Italy has 53 percent (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (2009a)).   
Indeed, Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006) argue that tertiary schooling is 
key for developed countries (see also Aghion and Howitt (2006)).  They develop a 
model where countries close to the world technology frontier should invest in colleges 
and universities in order to move the frontier out through innovation.  Developing 
countries on the other hand should invest in more basic education since they will grow 
by imitating the technologies of more developed countries.  This conclusion represents 
one of the few pieces of policy advice coming out of growth modeling that apply to 
developed countries.  The evidence, however, comes entirely from consideration of 
school attainment and not the more refined measures of human capital used here.   
The central issue of Section 4 is whether different levels or types of skills have payoffs 
that differ between developing and developed countries.  We separately measure basic 
and top skills, based on the micro data of the international achievement tests, and then 
consider the implications both of high skills and of tertiary schooling on growth.  The 
results suggest that basic skills have substantial growth payoffs in OECD countries, and 
that if anything, the return to top skills is lower, not higher, in the OECD – i.e., opposite 
of the innovation/imitation hypothesis.  We do not find a specific role of tertiary 
attainment for OECD growth once the focus is on long-run growth and direct measures 
of skills are taken into consideration.  
Results of the regression analyses suggest a strong and robust effect of cognitive skills 
on economic growth in OECD countries, but the regression analyses by themselves do 
not describe the path of benefits from any program of changing the skills of the 
population.  In the next part of the paper (Section 5), we therefore perform projections of 
the economic value of a set of education reform alternatives for each OECD country 
under different parameter assumptions.  Our focus is on understanding the dynamics of 
economic impacts of educational programs.  Three elements of the dynamics are 
particularly important for our consideration:  programs to improve cognitive skills 
through schools take time to implement; the impact of improved skills will not be 
realized until the students with greater skills move into the labor force; and the economy 
responds over time through the development and implementation of new technologies. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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In order to capture these elements, a simple simulation model is developed.   
Specifically, we evaluate the economic outcomes of a series of plausible policy 
programs including improving student performance by 25 PISA points (1/4 standard 
deviation); bringing all countries in the OECD up to the level of Finland; and bringing 
all students in OECD countries to minimum proficiency (400 points on the PISA tests).  
The present value of the reform efforts vary by country, depending on current 
economic performance and current educational performance.  However, the simulation 
exercises suggest that the aggregate gains across all OECD countries range from $90-
275 trillion for the different policy alternatives.  These gains, for example, far exceed the 
level of stimulus funds in the current global recession. 
We also provide detailed sensitivity analyses of the simulations with respect to a range 
of alternative specifications and parameter choices, including use of endogenous-growth 
and neoclassical-type specifications of the growth model; consideration of alternative 
coefficient estimates from the growth regressions; assessment of the lower and upper 
bound of the significance band around the growth-regression estimates; alternative time 
horizons for the future effects considered; alternative durations of the reform; alternative 
discount rates and growth rates of potential GDP; and alternative durations of working 
life. 
Knowledge of the potential gains from improving schools does not, however, indicate 
what should be done to obtain these results.  In fact, school improvement has been high 
on the policy agenda of a large number of OECD countries, but the results of actions 
have many times fallen short of expectations.  Emerging research results suggest that 
there are general policies that can promote significantly higher achievement.  The final 
section considers policy options that could support achievement improvements along the 
lines of the simulations. 
2. ECONOMIC MODELS AND BASIC RESULTS 
The basic theoretical and empirical framework follows developments of growth 
modeling over the past two decades.  In this work, human capital typically plays a 
prominent role, but we present evidence that the measurement of human capital 
dramatically alters the assessment of its importance.  Building on our database of 
international educational outcomes, we provide basic results on the relationship between 
educational outcomes and long-run growth in OECD countries.  
2.1. Conceptual framework 
Economists have considered the process of economic growth for much of the last 100 
years, but most studies remained as theory with little empirical work.
2  Over the past two 
decades, economists linked analysis much more closely to empirical observations and in 
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the process rediscovered the importance of growth.  The analysis here particularly 
concentrates on the role of human capital.  Human capital has been a central focus of 
much of the recent growth modeling, and it is a standard element of any empirical work.   
The prior analytical work has nonetheless diverged in important ways.  Economists 
have developed a number of alternative models designed to highlight important 
determinants of economic growth.  These theoretical views about the determinants of 
growth have gone in a variety of directions (see Box 1).  Two aspects of theoretical 
investigations stand out for the discussion here.  First, each of the approaches suggests 
somewhat different empirical specifications for any statistical modeling.  Second, while 
each of the approaches has some conceptual appeal, it has been difficult to test the 
validity of the alternatives in an adequate manner.  The restricted variation of 
experiences across countries plus general data limitations have made it difficult to 
distinguish among the competing models of growth – and such is the case here.   
 
Box 1. Education in theories of economic growth 
Theoretical models of economic growth have emphasized different mechanisms 
through which education may affect economic growth.  As a general summary, three 
theoretical models have been applied to the modeling of economic growth, and each has 
received support from the data.  At the same time, it has been difficult to compare the 
alternative models and to choose among them based on the economic growth data. 
The most straightforward modeling follows a standard characterization of an aggregate 
production function where the output of the macro economy is a direct function of the 
capital and labor in the economy.  The basic growth model of Solow (1957) began with 
such a description and then added an element of technological change to get the 
movement of the economy over time.  The sources of this technological change, 
although central to understanding growth, were not an integral part of the analysis.   
Augmented neoclassical growth theories, developed by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 
(1992), extend this analysis to incorporate education, stressing the role of education as a 
factor of production.  Education can be accumulated, increasing the human capital of the 
labor force and thus the steady-state level of aggregate income.  The human capital 
component of growth comes through accumulation of more education that implies the 
economy moves from one steady-state level to another; once at the new level, education 
exerts no further influence on growth.  The common approach to estimating this model is 
to relate changes in GDP per worker to changes in education (and capital).   
A very different view comes from the “endogenous growth” literature that has 
developed over the past two decades.  In this work, a variety of researchers (importantly, 
Lucas (1988), Romer (1990a), and Aghion and Howitt (1998)) stress the role of 
education in increasing the innovative capacity of the economy through developing new 
ideas and new technologies.  These are called endogenous growth models because 
technological change is determined by economic forces within the model.  Under these EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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models, a given level of education can lead to a continuing stream of new ideas, thus 
making it possible for education to affect growth even when no new education is added 
to the economy.  The common way to estimate these models is to relate growth rates in 
GDP per worker (or per capita) to the level of education. 
A final view of education in production and growth centers on the diffusion of 
technologies.  If new technologies increase firm productivity, countries can grow by 
adopting these new technologies more broadly.  Theories of technological diffusion such 
as Nelson and Phelps (1966), Welch (1970), and Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) stress that 
education may facilitate the transmission of knowledge needed to implement new 
technologies.  In tests involving cross-country comparisons, Benhabib and Spiegel 
(1994) find a role for education in both the generation of ideas and in the diffusion of 
technology.  
 
Our empirical analysis adopts a very simple growth model that combines elements of a 
general “endogenous growth” framework and a basic “augmented neoclassical” 
approach.  Specifically, we model a country’s growth rate as a function of the skills of 
workers and other factors that include initial levels of income and technology, economic 
institutions, and other systematic factors.  Skills are frequently referred to simply as the 
workers’ human capital stock.  
  growth = α1 human capital + α2 other factors + ε (1) 
In this formulation, nations with more human capital tend to continue to make greater 
productivity gains than nations with less human capital.  The fact that the rate of 
technological change and productivity improvement is directly related to the stock of 
human capital of the nation makes it an endogenous growth model.  The relationship 
between cognitive skills on the one hand and innovations and technology on the other 
seems to be a natural view of the role of education.  At the same time, by including the 
initial level of income among the control variables, our model does allow for conditional 
convergence, a leading feature of the “augmented neoclassical” approach, the commonly 
suggested alternative view.  
The empirical macroeconomic literature focusing on cross-country differences in 
economic growth has overwhelmingly employed measures related to school attainment, 
or years of schooling, to test the human capital aspects of growth models.
3  Initial 
analyses employed school enrollment ratios (e.g., Barro (1991); Mankiw, Romer, and 
Weil (1992)) as proxies for the human capital of an economy.  An important extension 
by Barro and Lee (1993, 2010) was the development of internationally comparable data 
on average years of schooling for a large sample of countries and years, based on a 
combination of census and survey data.  
                                                           
3 The earliest studies used adult literacy rates (e.g., Azariadis and Drazen (1990); Romer (1990b)) but these data cover a 
limited number of countries and are error prone. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
 
7 
The vast literature of cross-country growth regressions has tended to find a significant 
positive association between quantitative measures of schooling and economic growth.
4  
To give an idea of the robustness of this association, an extensive empirical analysis by 
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller (2004) of 67 explanatory variables in growth 
regressions on a sample of 88 countries found that primary schooling was the most 
robust influence factor (after an East Asian dummy) on growth in GDP per capita in 
1960-1996.  
Nevertheless, we believe that these formulations introduce substantial bias into the 
estimation.  Average years of schooling is a particularly incomplete and potentially 
misleading measure of education for comparing the impacts of human capital on the 
economies of different countries.  It implicitly assumes that a year of schooling delivers 
the same increase in knowledge and skills regardless of the education system.  For 
example, a year of schooling in South Africa is assumed to create the same increase in 
productive human capital as a year of schooling in Korea.  Additionally, formulations 
relying on this measure assume that formal schooling is the primary (sole) source of 
education and that variations in non-school factors have negligible effects on education 
outcomes and skills.  This neglect of cross-country differences in the quality of 
education and in the strength of family, health, and other influences is probably the 
major drawback of such a quantitative measure of schooling. 
To see this, consider a standard version of an education production function as 
employed in a very extensive literature (see Hanushek (2002) for a review), where skills 
are expressed as a function of a range of factors:  
  human capital = β1 family inputs + β 2 schooling inputs +   (2) 
  β 3 individual ability + β 4 other factors + υ 
In general, human capital combines both school attainment and its quality with the other 
relevant factors including education in the family, labor market experience, health, and 
so forth.  
Thus, while school attainment has been convenient in empirical work because of its 
ready availability across countries, its use as a proxy for human capital is very 
restrictive.  Not only does it ignore differences in school quality, but also any other 
important determinant of people’s skills.  Still, human capital is a latent variable that is 
not directly observed.  To be useful and verifiable, it is necessary to specify its 
measurement.   
A more satisfying alternative is to incorporate variations in cognitive skills, which can 
be determined by results of international assessments of mathematics, science, and 
reading achievement, as a direct measure of the human capital input into empirical 
analyses of economic growth.  The focus on cognitive skills has a number of potential 
advantages.  First, it captures variations in the knowledge and ability that schools strive 
to produce and thus relates the putative outputs of schooling to subsequent economic 
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success.  Second, by emphasizing total outcomes of education, it incorporates skills from 
any source – families, schools, and ability.  Third, by allowing for differences in 
performance among students with differing quality of schooling (but possibly the same 
quantity of schooling), it opens the investigation of the importance of different policies 
designed to affect the quality aspects of schools.
5  Fourth, it is practical because of the 
extensive development of consistent and reliable cross-country assessments. 
2.2. Data 
Our analysis relies on the measures of cognitive skills developed in Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2009).  These combine data from international tests given over the past 45 
years in order to develop a single comparable measure of skills for each country that can 
be used to index skills of people in the labor force.
6  
Between 1964 and 2003, twelve different international tests of math, science, or 
reading were administered to a voluntarily participating group of countries (see 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2010) for a review).  These include 36 different possible 
scores for year-age-test combinations (e.g., science for students of grade 8 in 1972 as 
part of the First International Science Study or math of 15-year-olds in 2000 as a part of 
the Programme on International Student Assessment).  The assessments are designed to 
identify a common set of expected skills, which were then tested in the local language.  
It is easier to do this in math and science than in reading, and a majority of the 
international testing has focused on math and science.  Each test is newly constructed, 
until recently with no effort to link to any of the other tests.  
The methodology used to construct consistent measures at the national level across 
countries relies on empirical calibration of the different tests.  By transforming the 
means and variances of the original country scores (partly based on external longitudinal 
test score information available for the United States), each is placed into a common 
distribution of outcomes (see Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) for details).
7  Each age 
group and subject is normalized to the PISA standard of mean 500 and individual 
                                                           
5 Some recent work has introduced the possibility that noncognitive skills also enter into individual economic outcomes (see 
importantly Bowles, Gintis, and Osborne (2001), Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006), and Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and 
Masterov (2006)).  Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) integrate noncognitive skills into the interpretation of general models 
such as above and show how this affects the interpretation of the parameter on school attainment and other estimates.  While 
there are no agreed-upon measures of noncognitive skills, at the aggregate level they might well be incorporated in “cultural 
differences.”  The importance of such cultural differences in empirical models of growth is considered in Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2009). 
6 With few exceptions direct measures of achievement of people in the labor force are unavailable, and analysis instead must 
rely upon skills measured during the schooling period.  The one exception with measures of the cognitive skills of people in 
the labor force is the 1994-98 International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), which tested representative samples of people aged 
16-65 years.  Coulombe, Tremblay, and Marchand (2004) have used these data to construct synthetic cohorts in order to 
estimate an augmented neoclassical growth model across 14 countries.  As discussed below, this construction causes no 
problems if the relative performance of people in different countries has remained constant, but it could introduce problems if 
that is not true.  
7 Transforming scores based on just the mean and variance is appropriate if the underlying score distribution is normal but 
potentially introduces errors for other underlying distributions.  A look at the underlying data reveals that the distribution of 
PISA scores within the OECD is normal, even if the distributions in individual countries may not be.  In the analysis of 
minimal and top skills below, the calculations employ the empirical micro distributions for each of the countries and do not 
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standard deviation of 100 across OECD countries, and then all available test scores are 
aggregated to the country level.   
We interpret the test scores as an index of the human capital of the populations (and 
workforce) of each country.  This interpretation of our averages over different cohorts is 
reasonable if a country’s scores have been stable over a long period, implying that 
estimates from the current school-aged population provide an estimate of the older 
working population.  If scores (and skills) do in fact change over time, some 
measurement error is clearly introduced.  We know that scores have changed some 
(Hanushek and Woessmann (2009)), but within our period of observations it still appears 
that the differences in levels dominate any intertemporal score changes.
8  Nonetheless, 
any measurement error in this case will tend to bias downward the estimates of the 
impact of cognitive skills on growth, so that our estimates of economic implications will 
be conservative. 
The data on GDP per capita and its growth for our analyses come from the Penn World 
Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002)).  Data on quantitative educational 
attainment are taken from the latest version of the Barro and Lee (2010) database.   
Additional measures of specific control variables will be discussed in the specific 
sections below. 
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics on the combined measure of educational 
performance and the underlying economic data.  We have already discussed the wide 
variation in growth rates across OECD countries.  What is also clear from Table 1 is that 
both school attainment and test scores vary widely, suggesting directly that any impact 
of these human capital measures on growth differences should be easily detected.   
2.3. Basic results for OECD countries  
We use the data on educational outcomes to estimate cross-country regressions that 
describe long-run growth for OECD countries.  This follows a growing literature which, 
over the past ten years, demonstrates that consideration of cognitive skills dramatically 
alters the assessment of the role of education and knowledge in the process of economic 
development.  Analyzing growth in 1960-1990 for a sample of 31 countries with 
available data (including 18 OECD countries), Hanushek and Kimko (2000) first showed 
a statistically and economically significant positive relationship between cognitive skills 
and economic growth.  This relationship between cognitive skills and economic growth 
has been subsequently confirmed in a range of studies with different focuses.
9  Most 
recently, Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) extend the empirical analysis to incorporate 
50 countries that have participated in one or more international testing occasions 
between 1964 and 2003 and have aggregate economic data for the period 1960-2000.  
We use that database for our analysis focused on OECD countries.  
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As a starting point for our analyses, we replicate the basic analysis, only replacing the 
extended version of the Cohen and Soto (2007) data on years of schooling by the newly 
available latest version of the Barro and Lee (2010) database on years of schooling.  Our 
sample contains the 24 OECD countries with available data.  From the total of 30 OECD 
countries, the sample misses four countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
the Slovak Republic – because their communist history prevents them from having 
internationally comparable economic data during the period of analysis in the underlying 
database.  In addition, Germany drops out because of missing economic and test score 
data for the Eastern parts before 1990, and Luxembourg is left out as a small country 
with a population of less than one million, as is common in growth analysis (see 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992)).  
Table 2 presents the basic results on the association between educational outcomes and 
long-run economic growth in the sample of OECD countries.  The inclusion of initial 
GDP per capita in all specifications simply reflects the fact that it is easier to grow when 
one is farther from the technology frontier, because one just must imitate others rather 
than invent new things.  (This “convergence term” enters into the subsequent projections 
of economic impacts from school reform, because it suggests that any differences in 
growth rates from changes in cognitive skills will eventually die out; see Section 5 
below). 
When the cognitive-skill data are ignored (column (1)), years of schooling in 1960 are 
significantly associated with average annual growth rates in real GDP per capita in 1960-
2000, after controlling for the initial level of GDP per capita.  However, once cognitive 
skills are included in the model (column (2)), the whole explanatory power is taken over 
by cognitive skills.  Cognitive skills are highly significantly associated with economic 
growth.  At the same time, the association between years of schooling and economic 
growth becomes statistically insignificant and drops to close to zero.  Furthermore, the 
OECD-sample growth variance explained by the model increases from 56 percent to 83 
percent when measuring human capital by cognitive skills rather than years of schooling.  
Note that in the OECD sample, the bivariate association with initial per-capita GDP 
already accounts for 49 percent of the variance in subsequent growth, making the 
relative increase in understanding non-convergence growth through cognitive skills 
substantial.  
The estimated coefficient on cognitive skills implies that an increase of one standard 
deviation in educational achievement (i.e., 100 test-score points on the PISA scale) 
yields an average annual growth rate over 40 years that is 1.86 percentage points higher.  
This historical experience suggests a very powerful response to improvements in 
educational outcomes, particularly when compared to the average 2.2 percent annual 
growth within the OECD over the past two decades.  
Figure 2 depicts the fundamental association graphically, plotting growth in real per-
capita GDP between 1960 and 2000 against average test scores after allowing for 
differences in initial GDP per capita and initial average years of schooling.  With the 
slight exceptions of New Zealand (below the regression line) and the United States 
(above) – to which we return below – the OECD countries align closely along the EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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regression line that depicts the positive association between cognitive skills and 
economic growth.  
Column (3) of Table 2 reports the same model excluding years of schooling, whose 
effect could not be significantly differentiated from zero.  The point estimate on 
cognitive skills, as well as the adjusted R
2, increases slightly in this reduced model.   
Columns (4) and (5) break down the analysis into the 20-year sub-periods of 1960-
1980 and 1980-2000.  The positive association of growth with cognitive skills is clearly 
visible in both sub-periods, with the point estimate slightly larger in the later period.  
To reduce concerns of reverse causality between economic growth and quantitative 
schooling investments, the basic model uses school attainment in 1960 before the growth 
period, but combines that with average test scores over the entire period.  However, the 
results are hardly affected by using average years of attainment across the period 
(column (6)).  
Because of the limited sample size, we want to ensure that results are not driven by 
individual outliers.  Columns (7) and (8) show the robustness of results to excluding 
specific countries.  Column (7) excludes Mexico and Turkey, two countries at the 
bottom of the sample of OECD countries today in terms of measures of GDP per capita, 
socioeconomic background, and educational spending.  While the point estimate on 
cognitive skills is slightly reduced, the association remains strong and statistically highly 
significant.  The same is true when excluding Korea (column (8)), a country with 
extraordinary conditional test scores and growth experience (see Figure 2).  
Finally, columns (9) and (10) provide tests for differences in the education-growth 
nexus between OECD and non-OECD countries.  The sample now is the full sample of 
50 countries with data on test scores and economic growth.  In the model without 
cognitive skills (column (9)), the significant association between years of schooling and 
economic growth does not differ significantly between OECD and non-OECD countries.  
However, the OECD dummy is marginally significant at the 10-percent level and 
positive, indicating a remaining growth advantage of OECD countries unexplained by 
the model.  But once cognitive skills are included in column (10), neither the OECD 
dummy nor its interaction with cognitive skills are statistically significant, indicating that 
the OECD countries actually fit well within the rest of the world on this association.
10  
We return to this issue when considering the separate impacts of economic institutions.  
3.  CAN INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN DIFFERENCES IN RICH-COUNTRY 
GROWTH? 
To understand to what extent consideration of institutional differences across OECD 
countries contributes to long-run growth differences and alters the assessment of the 
importance of educational outcomes, this section focuses on fundamental institutional 
measures of property rights and openness as well as measures of the regulation of 
product and labor markets in our OECD-country growth models. 
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3.1. Property-rights and free-trade institutions  
Most economists believe that fundamental economic institutions are important for a 
well-functioning economy, and by implication for economic growth.  The review in 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) strongly supports this premise.  Many studies 
have by now confirmed that institutions such as security of property rights and openness 
to international trade help to understand long-run differences in economic well-being 
between developed and developing countries.  However, the extent to which such 
institutions also help to explain long-run growth differences among developed countries 
is less clear.  Indeed, most OECD countries do not differ much in this respect, as they 
have all reached high levels of property-rights security and international openness.   
While these institutional factors may have contributed historically to their development, 
the lack of variation across countries would indicate that they lack power in explaining 
growth differences with the OECD. 
To test whether institutional differences contribute to our understanding of long-run 
growth differences between OECD countries and whether their consideration alters our 
result on the importance of educational outcomes, Table 3 enters basic institutional 
measures into our growth models.  Two measures have been most consistently found to 
be associated with growth and income differences in global country samples.  The first is 
the measure of security of property rights used, among others, by Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson (2001).  The measure is an index of the protection against expropriation 
risk, averaged over 1985-1995, from Political Risk Services, a private company which 
assesses the risk that investments will be expropriated in different countries.  The 
measure is scaled from 0 to 10, with higher values corresponding to higher security of 
property rights.  The second is the measure of openness proposed by Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 1997).  The index reflects the fraction of years between 1960 and 1998 that a 
country is classified as having an economy open to international trade, based on five 
factors including tariffs, quotas, exchange rate controls, export controls, and whether or 
not a socialist economy (see also Lucas (2009) for a recent application).  
Without considering cognitive skills, protection against expropriation is significantly 
associated with economic growth across the OECD countries between 1960 and 2000 
(column (1) of Table 3).  However, when cognitive skills are included in the model, the 
coefficient on the institutional variable drops substantially in size and becomes 
statistically insignificant, whereas the coefficient on cognitive skills remains highly 
significant and close to our previous models without institutional controls (column (2)).  
The statistical model clearly favors educational outcomes over institutions as a 
fundamental source of long-run growth differences between OECD countries.  This 
result supports the view expressed in Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 
(2004) that human capital may be the more basic source of growth than institutions.
11   
                                                           
11 The analysis of Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) has provided considerable support for the power of economic 
institutions based on their development of instruments based on historical colonization patterns.  An underlying argument is 
that colonists could bring with them a set of fundamental institutions that can be useful in explaining current institutions.  
Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) argue that the colonists not only brought knowledge of institutions 
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Conceptually, it is an open question whether any connection between human capital 
and institutions stems from human capital causing better institutions or the opposite.  But 
at least within the group of OECD countries, that part of institutional variation that is not 
related to cognitive skills is not related to long-run growth, whereas that part of skill 
variation that is not related to institutions remains a strong predictor of long-run growth.  
Column (3) adds the measure of openness to the model.  Property-rights security and 
openness to trade are individually and jointly insignificant in predicting long-run OECD 
growth, whereas cognitive skills remain strongly significant.  Again, the insignificance 
in the institutional measures does not mean that institutions are unimportant for long-run 
growth.  Rather, they point to the fact that the OECD countries share broadly similar 
institutions, so that this kind of institutional variation is unlikely to account for much of 
the substantial variation in long-run growth in this rich-country sample.  For example, 
while there is some variation in the openness measure among OECD countries, it is very 
specific and limited.  Most OECD countries are coded as open throughout the period of 
observation.  The exceptions are Mexico, New Zealand, and Turkey that had substantial 
periods of being more closed, but the differences between the openness of these and the 
remainder of the OECD explain little of OECD growth differences.  
This argument is underlined by results of the full-country sample (column (4)).  The 
institutional measures enter jointly significantly in explaining long-run growth 
differences among the 50 countries with available data.  However, as the specification 
reported in column (5) indicates, there is a significant difference in the institutions-
growth nexus between the OECD countries and the non-OECD countries.  The 
interaction between an OECD indicator and protection against expropriation brings the 
institutional effect close to zero in the OECD sample, and the difference is marginally 
significant (at the 13 percent level).  The OECD indicator and the interaction jointly 
reach statistical significance at conventional levels.
12  
In sum, property-rights and free-trade institutions help us understand long-run growth 
differences between rich and poor countries, but they do not contribute to our 
understanding of long-run growth differences within the group of rich countries.  By 
contrast, the significant effect of cognitive skills on long-run growth in the OECD 
sample is robust to the inclusion of the institutional measures.  
3.2. Regulation of product and labor markets 
While the variation in fundamental property-rights and free-trade institutions may be 
limited among OECD countries, a substantial literature has stressed significant 
differences in how OECD countries regulate their product and labor markets.  For 
example, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) show that short-run growth experiences across 
OECD countries are related to product market regulations, and Cingano, Leonardi, 
Messina, and Pica (2010) find that employment protection legislation is associated with 
                                                           
12 An interaction between openness and the OECD indicator does not reach significance when added to this model. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
 
14 
firm-level investment and other firm outcomes across sectors and across firms with 
different financial constraints.  
The question is to what extent the effects found for short- to medium-run growth 
experiences and for between-industry and between-firm growth carry over to the long-
run growth experiences of countries.  For example, effects of product market regulations 
on sectoral productivity may lead to structural change and international specialization, 
thereby reducing any net effects on aggregate growth rates.  Similarly, differences in 
employment protection legislation may lead to differential growth experiences in booms 
versus recessions that cancel out over the business cycle.  
To test the importance of product and labor market regulations for long-run OECD 
growth, we add a rich set of regulatory measures that the OECD has developed over the 
past decade to our growth models.  Specifically, we employ the latest versions of these 
far-ranging indicators of regulations of both product and labor markets.  These are 
documented for product market regulations (PMR) in Venn (2009), who updates 
previous versions since Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(1999), and for employment protection legislation (EPL) in Wölfl, Wanner, Kozluk, and 
Nicoletti (2009), who update previous versions since Nicoletti, Scarpetta, and Boylaud 
(2000).
13  
The results, reported in Table 4, are unambiguous and telling: Not a single of the large 
battery of measures derived to depict product and labor market regulations comes close 
to being significantly related to the variation in long-run growth experiences across 
OECD countries.  At the same time, regulatory practices do not affect the result that 
educational outcomes are a powerful predictor of long-run growth differences among 
OECD countries.  
Specifically, the first six columns of Table 4 employ aggregate and sub-indicators of 
product market regulation.  Each indicator is scaled from 0 to 6, with higher values 
reflecting more restrictive policies.  The first column uses the most aggregate indicator 
of product market regulation, which is constructed from a total of 18 low-level 
indicators.  The coefficient is insignificant and close to zero.  The same is true for the 
two broad sub-categories of administrative regulation and domestic economic regulation 
(columns (2) and (3)).  The next three columns report results for the specific sub-
indicators referring to measures of state control, barriers to entrepreneurship, and 
barriers to trade and investment, respectively.  None of the measures is significantly 
associated with long-run OECD growth.  
Additional specific robustness specifications (not shown) confirm this basic result.  For 
example, the results hold for all underlying sub-indices, including indicators of public 
ownership, involvement in business operations, regulatory and administrative opacity, 
administrative burdens on start-ups, barriers to competition, and explicit and other 
barriers to trade and investment.  The available indicators of product market regulation 
refer to 1998, the first year for which they are available.  While earlier measures would 
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be preferable, these should still capture the most basic overall patterns, under the 
assumption that main institutional variation is in the cross-section.  At least, results are 
unaffected by using the available indicators for 2003 or 2008 instead, or by taking the 
average over the three observations, indicating that lack of results is not driven by single 
measurement error.  In addition, to align the regulatory measures more closely with the 
period of growth observations, we performed all regressions for growth between 1980 
and 2000.  Results were unaffected.  
The final five columns of Table 4 employ aggregate and sub-indicators of labor market 
regulation, which again range from 0 to 6 with higher values reflecting more restrictions.  
Columns (7) and (8) add the two versions of the aggregate employment protection index 
suggested by the OECD to the model.  The first version combines regulations of regular 
employment contracts and of temporary contracts, and the second version adds sub-
indices of additional regulation of collective dismissal to this.  Neither measure enters 
the model significantly or affects the estimate on cognitive skills.  The same is true when 
the three sub-indicators of protection of permanent workers against (individual) 
dismissal, strictness of regulation on temporary forms of employment, and specific 
requirements for collective dismissal separately (columns (9)-(11)).  
The indicators of employment regulation are measured as averages of the annual 
values between 1985 and 2000.  Results are similar when the growth period is restricted 
to 1980-2000, which aligns more closely to the period of observation of the regulatory 
measures, is used instead of 1960 to 2000 (not shown).  Results are also robust to the 
new, third version of the aggregate OECD employment protection index, available only 
in 2008, which adds the maximum time to make a claim of unfair dismissal, 
authorization and reporting requirements for temporary work agencies, and regulations 
requiring equal treatment of regular and agency workers at the user firm as three new 
sub-indicators.  
Beyond the regulatory measures reported in Table 4, Nicoletti and Pryor (2006) survey 
a total of 16 objective and subjective measures of governmental regulation from four 
different studies, including Botero et al. (2004), Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 
(1999), Pryor (2002), and earlier versions of the indicators used above.  While the above 
objective indicators are based on extensive reviews and quantifications of laws and 
regulations, other more subjective indicators are based on observational data of experts 
familiar with the regulations.  The different indicators also cover different sets of 
regulations on product and labor markets, as well as overall business regulations more 
generally.  Not a single of the regulation measures is significantly associated with long-
run growth across OECD countries in our basic model (not shown).  These results 
confirm that the lack of a significant association with long-run OECD growth does not 
hinge on a specific objective or subjective method of quantifying institutional realities or 
on a specific area of regulations.  
The results of including institutional and regulatory measures in the growth regressions 
rule out that the strong association of educational outcomes with growth is just driven by 
omitted causal institutional factors.  In fact, the analysis provides no convincing 
evidence that institutional or regulatory differences can account for differences in long-EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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run growth among rich countries.  Instead, cognitive skills emerge as the one strong 
policy factor underlying growth differences across OECD countries.  
4. DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SKILLS AND EDUCATION  
An important and recurring policy question is which level of skills and education is 
most decisive for OECD growth.  We analyze several dimensions of this:  whether there 
are differential returns across countries to average skills; whether basic skills are more or 
less important than top levels of skills; and whether there is a specific role of tertiary 
attainment for OECD growth.   
4.1. Differential returns to average skills  
As a first dimension of heterogeneity, we analyze whether the effect of average 
educational outcomes differs along specific dimensions.  First, the graphical plot of 
Figure 2 suggests that there is no obvious non-linearity in the test score-growth 
association across OECD countries.  Thus, a squared test-score term does not enter the 
model significantly, and an exponential test-score specification does not improve the fit 
of the model (not shown).  
Second, there is no obvious difference in the effect of average test scores between 
countries with initially low vs. high income.  While the small sample size does not allow 
for extensive interaction models, an interaction of test scores with an indicator for above-
median initial GDP per capita does not enter the model significantly (not shown).  
Third, Figure 3 plots quantile regression estimates in 5 percent steps of the effect of 
average test scores for percentiles of the growth distribution.  It is evident that the effect 
is relatively constant across the whole distribution of growth residuals.  In fact, all 
quantile regression point estimates fall within standard confidence intervals around the 
OLS estimate.  The estimated average effect thus provides a good representation of the 
effect across the full range of quantiles of the conditional growth distribution and is not 
driven by specifics in certain parts of the conditional distribution.  
The combined results of non-linear specifications, skill interactions, and quantile 
regressions suggest no obvious patterns of differential returns to average cognitive skills in 
the sample of OECD countries.  
4.2. Basic vs. top skills  
A leading policy question refers to the effects of different ranges of the skill 
distribution.  Should developed countries implement relatively egalitarian education 
policies or rather relatively elitist policies?  Should they focus on decent basic skills for 
the whole population or on nurturing top scientists and engineers?  To address such 
questions, we make use of the micro data of each of the international achievement tests 
to calculate the population shares in each country that reach a threshold of basic skills EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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and a threshold of top skills (see Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) for details).  Using 
such distributional information allows us to look at different dimensions of the skill 
distribution separately.  
Conceptually, Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006) assume that the innovation 
process is more intensive in high-skill labor than the imitation process.  They then 
present an endogenous growth model with innovation and imitation where high-skill 
labor has a greater growth-enhancing effect for countries closer to the technological frontier, 
whereas countries further from the technological frontier get greater value from what they 
call “unskilled human capital”.  While the untested underlying assumption seems 
reasonable, there are also reasonable arguments to be made for an opposite assumption – 
in which case the main prediction of the model would be turned around.  In particular, 
the innovation literature points out that many innovations emerge from lucky 
coincidences.  By contrast, almost by definition purposeful imitation processes require 
the employment of skilled scientists.  
Another conceptual extension starts from the perspective of a high-skilled scientist.  If 
this scientist were to work in a country that produces at the technological frontier, his 
only option is to use his skill in the innovation of new technologies.  If the scientist, by 
contrast, were to work in a country that produces far below the technological frontier, he 
also has the option to employ his skills in such innovative activities, but he also has the 
alternative additional option to employ his skills in imitating the more productive 
technologies currently employed at the technological frontier.  This scientist will tend to 
choose to employ his skills in the activity that promises the higher benefits.  In such a 
setting, the return to high-skill labor cannot be smaller below the technological frontier 
than at it, and it may well be larger.  While concentrations of high-skilled labor and 
spillovers across them may still be important, the alternative perspectives do introduce 
questions about the underlying assumptions. 
Given the conflicting conceptual predictions, the issue warrants a new empirical look.  
In particular, while the empirical application in Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir 
(2006) measures growth in 5-year periods, which may be substantially influenced by 
business cycles and idiosyncratic shocks across 19 OECD countries, we keep our focus 
on differences in long-term growth experiences across the OECD countries.  In addition, 
while Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006) conceptualize the difference between 
high- and low-skill labor as school attainment at the tertiary vs. non-tertiary level, our 
alternative focus on top vs. basic skills may provide an empirical distinction particularly 
relevant for imitation and innovation processes.  
We start by replicating the results in Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) of 
incorporating both the share of students who reach a basic level of skills (a score of at 
least 400 on the tests)  and the share of students who reach top-level skills (a score of at 
least 600) in a growth regression of the full 50-country sample of OECD and non-OECD 
countries (column (1) of Table 5).
14  Both skill dimensions enter the model significantly, 
                                                           
14 These scores are one standard deviation below and above the OECD mean, respectively.  The OECD also identifies five 
levels of skills on each of its tests (see, for example, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004)).  The 
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but the point estimate on the top-skill dimension is substantially higher.  A ten 
percentage-point increase in the basic-skill share is associated with 0.3 percentage points 
higher annual growth, and a ten percentage-point increase in the top-skill share is 
associated with 1.3 percentage points higher annual growth.  (Note that this does not 
necessarily provide an estimate of the relative importance of the two skill dimensions, as 
it may be much more feasible to increase the basic share than to increase the top share by 
the same amount; this might be suggested by the fact that the international standard 
deviation of the basic skill percentage is about four times as large as that of the top-skill 
level).  
When estimating the same model on the OECD sample, though, the point estimate on 
the top-skill share is only a fourth of the one estimated in the full country sample and 
loses statistical significance (column (2)).  By contrast, the point estimate on the basic-
skill share is slightly larger than in the full country sample, and remains highly 
significant.  The specification of column (3) shows that the difference in the estimate on 
the top-skill share between OECD and non-OECD countries is statistically significant.  
Of course, the measures of the two skill dimensions are highly collinear (their correlation 
is 0.73 in the full sample and 0.70 in the OECD sample), limiting precision in the joint 
specification.  Results in columns (4)-(9), however, reveal that the pattern of results is 
similar when entering one of the two measures at a time.  
While small samples and collinearity obviously suggest caution in the interpretation of 
these results, it seems clear that basic skills are relevant for OECD-country growth.   
Furthermore, if anything, high-level skills appear more important in non-OECD than in 
OECD countries, rather than the other way around.  
4.3. Non-tertiary vs. tertiary schooling 
The available test score measures – for average, basic, and top skills – are measured at 
the primary and secondary level of schooling.  However, a lot of policy discussion 
focuses on another dimension of schooling, namely whether developed countries should 
place a particular focus on primary, secondary, or tertiary education.  Vandenbussche, 
Aghion, and Meghir (2006) suggest that countries close to the technological frontier 
should rather emphasize tertiary education.  To investigate this dimension, we make use 
of the new, improved Barro and Lee (2010) database which provides average years of 
schooling separately at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level.  With little meaningful 
variation in the completion of primary education across the bulk of OECD countries, we 
combine the two basic levels of schooling into one category of non-tertiary schooling.  
In the full-country sample, the coefficients on non-tertiary and tertiary schooling are 
both close to zero when cognitive skills are controlled for (column (1) of Table 6).  By 
contrast, in the OECD sample, the point estimate on years of tertiary schooling becomes 
larger (column (2)), and reaches marginal significance (at the 10 percent level) when 
years of non-tertiary schooling are not included in the model (column (3)).  However, 
results in column (4) indicate that this is completely driven by the United States.  Once EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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the United States is excluded, the coefficient on tertiary education is much small and 
insignificant again.  The United States is well-known for its extensive tertiary education 
system, and Figure 2 already indicated that the United States has the strongest positive 
residual in the growth model.  While this might be an indication of growth-enhancing 
effects of its high-quality higher-education system, the lack of robustness in the sample 
without the United States suggests that it might rather be an indication of the high-skilled 
immigrant population that it attracts, of a particular set of economic institutions (not 
captured by our institutional measures), or of any other idiosyncrasy of the US 
economy.
15  
An additional interesting pattern emerges when employing the measures of different 
skill dimensions.  When the basic-skill share is used as an alternative skill measure to the 
average skills, years of tertiary schooling reach significance (column (5)).  When, by 
contrast, the top-skill share is used, the coefficient on years of tertiary schooling 
becomes smaller and loses any significance (column (6)).  This pattern is indicative that 
years of tertiary education proxy for the share of students with high-level skills.  When 
the United States is disregarded, the coefficient on years of tertiary schooling declines to 
close to zero in this specification (column (7)).  
While the possibility to distinguish the effects of different dimensions of the skill and 
schooling distribution again is limited in these small samples, some basic patterns prove 
clear.  First, the significant effect of cognitive skills is extremely robust to consideration 
of any quantitative measure of different levels of school attainment.  Second, the finding 
of Vandenbussche, Aghion, and Meghir (2006) of a particular effect of tertiary 
attainment in rich countries is not robust once the focus is on long-run growth 
experiences and educational outcome measures are taken into account.  Of course, this 
does not mean that learning beyond the secondary level does not matter.  Rather, in the 
spirit of a lifecycle interpretation where early skills facilitate the development of 
subsequent skills (Heckman (2006); Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006)), it 
means that outcome measures of learning in school are a good predictor for the 
accumulation of further skills in life and the capacity to deploy these skills effectively.  
5. CALCULATING THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF EDUCATION REFORMS 
The results so far indicate that educational outcomes have a strong effect on long-run 
economic growth of OECD countries.  However, they do not tell us directly how much 
improvements in educational outcomes would actually be worth.  In particular, the 
growth-rate effects do not map linearly into the economic value of any education reform 
in a country, not least because different time lags are involved between successful 
reform in the education system today and the improvement of skills in the national 
workforce.   
In this section, we therefore perform simulation analyses that use the estimates from 
the previous sections to project what the results mean for the economic impact of 
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different scenarios of school improvements in the OECD member states.  The 
projections presume that the estimated impacts of cognitive skills on growth are causal 
in nature – that is, changing the achievement of a country’s population will lead to 
improved growth.  Of course, considerable controversy surrounds such cross-country 
growth regressions and any causal interpretation of them (see, for example, Levine and 
Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos (1993), and Bils and Klenow (2000)).  In other work, 
we have considered a series of analyses aimed at eliminating many of the natural 
concerns about the identification of the causal impacts of cognitive skills (Hanushek and 
Woessmann (2009)).  Each of the analyses points to the plausibility of a causal 
interpretation of the basic models.  Nonetheless, with our limited international variations, 
it is difficult to demonstrate identification conclusively.  Therefore, here we consider a 
variety of sensitivity analyses designed to show the impact on outcomes when part of the 
estimated effects is non-causal. 
We consider three specific reform scenarios:  first, improving average student 
performance 1/4 standard deviation, or 25 PISA points, in each country; second, 
bringing all OECD countries up to the level of the PISA top-performer, Finland; and 
third, bringing all students in OECD countries to minimum proficiency, defined as 400 
points on the PISA test scale.  For each scenario, we aim to project the future path of 
development of GDP in a country to calculate the economic value of the education 
reform in present-value terms. 
One final issue of the projections is important.  Because we consider economic 
outcomes far into the future, the precise form of the underlying growth model potentially 
makes a noticeable difference.  In particular, an endogenous growth model that implies 
constant growth effects from improved skills will differ from a neoclassical growth 
model that sees changes in skills as affecting the level of income but not the long-run 
growth rate of an economy.  Our previously estimated models support analysis of this 
range of underlying models, and applying the alternatives gives another idea of the 
bounds on future economic effects from school improvement.  
5.1. The projection model 
The projection of the total value of any education reform involves several components.  
First, we calculate the time path of the annual growth rate engendered by education 
reform designed to move students from their current performance to a given new level.  
This pattern of economic outcomes represents the confluence of three separate dynamic 
processes: (1) Changes in schools lead to the progressive improvement in student 
achievement until students fully reach the new steady-state level of achievement;  (2) 
students with better skills move into the labor force and the average skills of workers 
increase as new, higher achieving workers replace retiring workers; and  (3) the 
economy responds to the progressive improvement of the average skill level of the 
workforce.  Second, based on the pattern of predicted growth rates, we model the future 
development of GDP with and without the education reform.  Third, based on these EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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projections, we calculate the total value of the reform by aggregating the discounted 
values of the annual differences between the GDP with reform and the GDP without 
reform.   
Our initial depiction is based on the endogenous-growth framework where higher test 
scores yield a permanent increase in the long-run growth rate.  We subsequently consider 
a neoclassical framework where the additional convergence term makes the annual 
growth rate a negative function of the (log) level of GDP reached in the previous period.  
This alternative implies that the additional growth due to higher test scores is only 
transitory, leading to a new higher income steady-state path but one where the economy 
grows in the long run at the same rate as it would have without the reform.  
5.1.1. Increase in the annual growth rate in the different phases 
For expositional convenience, the description of the projections follows the basic 
Scenario I where each OECD country begins an educational reform program in 2010 that 
takes 20 years to be fully implemented and where subsequent students reach the new 
achievement level.  The economic value of the reforms is then traced across an 80-year 
period (which represents the expected lifetime of somebody born in 2010).  The basic 
set-up is easily modified to consider alternative scenarios. 
a) Phase 1 (2010-2030):  In the baseline simulations, the education reform program is 
assumed to take 20 years to complete, and the path of increased achievement during this 
phase is taken as linear.  The additional growth in GDP per capita due to the reform in 
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where the growth coefficient stems from the regression estimations presented in the 
previous sections and ΔPISA is the increase in the average PISA test score due to the 
respective reform.  The working life term indicates that each cohort of new, higher 
achieving students is only a fraction of the total labor force. 
b) Phase 2 (2031-2050):  The education reform is now fully enacted, and achievement 
of all subsequent students remains at the new level.  But for the length of a work life 
from the start of reform, which in the baseline simulations is assumed to last 40 years, 
there are still workers with initial levels of skills that are being replaced in retirement by 
higher achieving workers.  During this phase, the additional growth in GDP per capita in 
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c) Phase 3 (2051-2070):  During this phase, the first 20 labor-market cohorts – which 
only partially profited from the education reform – are replaced by cohorts that profited 
from the fully enacted education reform: 
  ( )
1 41 40 1
* *
− − − Δ + Δ − Δ − Δ = Δ
t t t t
life working
PISA t coefficien growth  (5) 
d) Phase 4 (after 2070):  Finally, the whole workforce has gone through the reformed 
education system.  The annual growth rate is now increased by the constant long-run 
growth effect Δ: 
  PISA t coefficien growth Δ = Δ *  (6) 
5.1.2. Development of GDP with and without reform 
a) Without reform, the economy grows at the constant growth rate of potential GDP: 
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b) With reform, the annual growth rate is additionally increased by the growth effect 
Δ
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In the neoclassical specification, an additional term ensures that the growth rate is 
negatively affected by the (log) level of GDP reached in the previous period.  As a 
consequence, the annual growth rate without and with reform will converge to the same 
rate of potential growth in the long run.  
5.1.3. Total effect of the reform 
The total value of any reform is given by the sum of the discounted values of the 
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 (9) 
In the baseline scenario, the time horizon over which future returns will be considered is 
the lifetime of a child that is born at the beginning of the reform, which equals the year 
2090.  EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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5.1.4. Parameter values 
Implementing the projection model requires a number of parameter assumptions.   
Three parameter choices have already been indicated: the duration of the education 
reform of 20 years, the length of a working life of 40 years, and the overall time horizon 
of 80 years.  In addition, the model requires assumptions about the growth coefficient, 
the rate of potential growth without the education reform, and the discount rate.  Here, 
we outline the parameter choices for the baseline scenario.  Below, we will also provide 
robustness analyses of results to alternative parameter choices.  
The simulation does not adopt any specific reform package but instead focuses just on 
the ultimate change in achievement.  For the purposes here, reforms are assumed to take 
20 years to complete, and the path of increased achievement during the reform period is 
taken as linear.  For example, an average improvement of 25 points on PISA is assumed 
to reflect a gain in the student population of 1.25 points per year.  This might be realistic, 
for example, when the reform relies upon a process of upgrading the skills of teachers – 
either by training for existing teachers or by changing the workforce through 
replacement of existing teachers.  This linear path dictates the quality of new cohorts of 
workers at each point in time. 
The expected work life is assumed to be 40 years, which implies that each new cohort 
of workers is 2.5 percent of the workforce.  Thus, even after an educational reform is 
fully implemented, it takes 40 years until the full labor force is at the new skill level.  We 
are not aware of direct estimates of this parameter in the literature.  However, estimates 
for Germany based on pension insurance data suggest values in the range of 35 to 40 
years for the length of the average working life (see Woessmann and Piopiunik (2009) 
for details).  
The length of the time period over which gains are calculated is somewhat arbitrary 
and depends in part on the use of the analysis for any policy decisions.  The benchmark 
here considers all economic returns that arise during the lifetime of a child that is born at 
the beginning of the reform in 2010.  According to the most recent data (that refer to 
2006), a simple average of male and female life expectancy at birth over all OECD 
countries is 79 years (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(2009c)).
16  Therefore, the baseline calculations take a time horizon until 2090, 
considering all future returns that accrue until then, but neglecting any returns that 
accrue after 2090. 
In order to consider the impacts of improvement on OECD countries, the simulations 
rely on the estimates of growth relationships derived from the 24 OECD countries with 
complete data.  As indicated in column (2) of Table 2, the coefficient estimate is 1.864, 
suggesting that, e.g., a 50 point higher average PISA score (i.e., one-half standard 
deviation higher) would be associated with 0.93 percent higher annual growth in the long 
run.  This estimate clearly includes some uncertainty, a factor that is also included in the 
robustness analyses below.  (Below we also consider a neoclassical alternative where the 
                                                           
16 Note that these life expectancy numbers are based on age-specific mortality rates prevalent in 2006, and as such do not 
include the effect of any future decline in age-specific mortality rates.  Life expectancy at birth has increased by an average of 
more than 10 years since 1960. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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impact on growth rates is not assumed to be permanent but in fact falls over time 
according to the estimated convergence parameter until growth rates return to the current 
level). 
The value of improvement in economic outcomes from added growth depends, of 
course, also on the path of economies that would be obtained without educational 
improvement.  The analysis here takes the annual growth of OECD economies in the 
absence of education reform to be 1.5 percent.  This is simply the average annual growth 
rate of potential GDP per worker of the OECD area over the past two decades:  1.5 
percent in 1987-1996 and 1.4 percent in 1997-2006 (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2009b)). 
Finally, because economic benefits accrue at varying times into the future, it is 
important to recognize that more immediate benefits are both more valuable and more 
certain than those far in the future.  In order to incorporate this, the entire stream is 
converted into a present discounted value.  In simplest terms, the present discounted 
value is the current dollar amount that would be equivalent to the future stream of 
returns calculated from the growth model.  If we had that amount of funds and invested 
it today, it would be possible to reproduce the future stream of economic benefits from 
the principal amount and the investment returns.  Thus, this calculation of present 
discount value allows a relevant comparison for any other current policy actions.  
In doing so, the discount rate at which to adjust future benefits becomes an important 
parameter.  A standard value of the social discount rate used in long-term projections on 
the sustainability of pension systems and public finance is 3 percent (e.g., Börsch-Supan 
(2000), Hagist, Klusen, Plate, and Raffelhüschen (2005)), a precedent that is followed 
here.
17  By contrast, the influential Stern Review report that estimates the cost of climate 
change uses a discount rate of only 1.4 percent, thereby giving a much higher value to 
future costs and benefits (Stern (2007)).  In our robustness analyses, we will also 
consider such alternative discount rates.  
A number of additional assumptions go into the projections.  First, they assume that 
skills play the same role in the future as they have in the past, so that the evidence of past 
results provides a direct way to project the future.  Second, while the statistical analysis 
did not look at how economies adjust to improved skills, the calculations assume that the 
experience of other countries with greater cognitive skills provide the relevant insight 
into how the new skills will be absorbed into the economy.  Third, the projection of 
simultaneous improvement across countries presumes that all countries can grow faster 
without detracting from (or benefiting) growth in other countries. 
                                                           
17 As a practical value for the social discount rate in cost-benefit analysis (derived from an optimal growth rate model), Moore 
et al. (2004) suggest using a time-declining scale of discount rates for intergenerational projects that do not crowd out private 
investment, starting with 3.5 percent for years 0-50, 2.5 percent for years 50-100, 1.5 percent for years 100-200, 0.5 percent for 
years 200-300, and 0 percent years over 300.  (The proper starting value is actually 3.3 percent based on the parameter values 
they assume for the growth rate in per capita consumption (2.3 percent), the social marginal utility of consumption with respect 
to per capita consumption (1), and the utility discount rate (1 percent)). EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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5.2. Results of base scenarios 
We start with the results of the baseline projection model in an endogenous-growth 
framework for the three education reform scenarios.  All calculations are in real 
(inflation-adjusted) terms – 2010 dollars under purchasing power parity.  
5.2.1. Scenario I: Increase average performance by 25 PISA points 
A simple starting point is to consider the economic impact on OECD countries of a 
0.25 standard deviation improvement, equivalent to a 25 point increase on PISA scores.  
The reform policy is begun in 2010 and on average yields 25 point higher scores in 2030 
that remain permanently at that level for all subsequent students.
18  
A policy like this is uniform across countries, so the relative improvement is the same 
for all countries.
19  Figure 4 provides a summary of the marginal impact on GDP for 
each year into the future.  While there are no impacts initially until higher-achieving 
students start becoming more significant in the labor market, GDP will be more than 3 
percent higher than what would be expected without improvements in human capital as 
early as 2041.  (The figure also shows a 95 percent confidence bound of 1.9-4.1 percent 
higher GDP, based on the relevant 95 percent confidence bounds for the regression 
coefficient in column (2) of Table 2.  By the end of expected life in 2090 for the person 
born in 2010, GDP per capita would be expected to be over 26 percent above the 
“education as usual” level. 
The magnitude of such a change is best understood with an example.  In the absence of 
changes in educational policy, France would be expected to have a GDP (in 2010 USD) 
of $3,606 billion in 2041.  If on the other hand it achieved the improvement in cognitive 
skills that took it from an average PISA score of 505 to 530, total GDP would be 
expected to be $3,715 in 2041, or $108 billion higher.
20  These calculations illustrate a 
simple point:  While 3 percent may at first seem like a small change, it is a very large 
number when applied to the entire GDP of any of the OECD countries. 
These calculations are by themselves misleading, because the impacts of improved 
cognitive skills continue to occur far into the future.  The 3.0 percent improvement in 
2041 rises to a 5.9 percent improvement in 2050, 15.3 percent in 2070, and 26.3 percent 
in 2090.  These dynamic improvements in the economy yield on-going gains to society, 
and the appropriate summary of the impact of educational improvements accumulates 
the value of these annual gains. 
                                                           
18 All calculations of PISA scores underlying the following simulations refer to the average performance in math and science 
(in line with the underlying growth model, as noted above), averaged over the three PISA cycles 2000, 2003, and 2006 (see 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001, 2003, 2004, 2007)).  All underlying measures of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) are in US dollars, measured in purchasing power parities (PPP), expressed in prices of 2010.  The 
GDP measures were calculated from the most recent measure of GDP in current prices and current PPPs available for all 
countries (2007, extracted from http://stats.oecd.org on 10 August 2009), projected to 2010 using OECD estimates of annual 
changes in potential GDP and in GDP deflators (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009b)). 
19 Note that the calculations also assume that the top ranked countries can feasibly improve their scores.  The relatively flat 
performance of countries such as Japan and Korea that have been at the top for a number of years raises the question about 
whether there is room for further improvement or whether there is some sort of ceiling effect in the existing tests.  As an 
alternative, the next scenario will only assume improvements that do not go beyond the current top performer.  
20 These calculations assume a constant population size over this period. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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Importantly, after all people in the labor force have obtained the new and improved 
education (in 2070), annual growth will be 0.47 percentage points higher.  This implies 
that each country that achieves the average improvement of ¼ standard deviation of 
achievement will have a cumulative impact on the economy through 2090 that is equal to 
288 percent of current year GDP.  The first column of Table 7 provides these discounted 
values of all of the future increases through 2090 for each OECD country.  The dollar 
value for each country varies by the level of GDP in 2010 – but the total impact across 
the OECD is $123 trillion in present value.   
Because these are put into present value terms, they can be compared to current 
economic values.  For example, these calculations indicate that the value of 
improvements through long-run growth far outstrips the cost of the current worldwide 
recession (and are much larger than the worldwide fiscal stimulus efforts). 
5.2.2. Scenario II: Bring each country to Finland average level (of 546 PISA points) 
The success of Finland on the PISA tests is well-known.  In the second scenario, the 
performance of Finnish students is taken as a benchmark for the performance levels that 
are possible.  The economic impact calculated is found from projecting the impact on 
growth for each OECD country under the assumption that it could bring itself to the top 
of the rankings as identified by Finland – an average PISA score of 546.   
Obviously, the amount of reform necessary varies by where each OECD country ranks 
on PISA today.  Commensurately, the impact on different economies varies by the size 
of reform (in addition to the size of the economy itself).  Finland, for example, under this 
scenario would neither change its schools nor see any long-term economic changes.  On 
the other side, Mexico and Turkey would require enormous changes in their educational 
achievement, and, if the changes were feasible, would see their economies completely 
transformed.  
Columns (2)-(5) of Table 7 present the country-by-country impacts of these changes.  
On average, the OECD countries would see a nearly 50 point increase in performance 
(one-half standard deviation).  While the change in Japan or Korea amounts to about 5 
points, the change in Mexico is 144 points – an almost inconceivable change given 
current knowledge of how to transform schools or cognitive skills in general.  (Again, 
the calculations assume that adjustment is complete within 20 years.  An alternative view 
would be that a number of countries would actually require more than 20 years for a 
reform program to yield such large changes.  We model the implications in the 
robustness analyses below). 
The present value for OECD improvements under this scenario is $275 trillion, or 
more than six times the current GDP of the OECD countries.  The United States itself, 
which currently falls over 50 points behind Finland, would by historical growth patterns 
see a present value of improved GDP of over $112 trillion, or some 40 percent of the 
OECD total – reflecting both the size of the country and its distance behind Finland.  
Germany would see a $17 trillion improvement, or more than five times current GDP.   EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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The rankings of countries according to increases compared to current GDP are shown 
in Figure 5.  One interpretation of this figure is the amount of economic leverage from 
educational improvements that is possible for different OECD countries.   
5.2.3. Scenario III: Bring everyone up to minimum skill level of 400 PISA points 
The final scenario considered is a “compensatory” improvement in education where all 
students are brought up to a minimal skill level – which is defined here as obtaining a 
score of 400 on the PISA tests, or one standard deviation below the OECD average.  
While the previous simulations could be thought of as displaying the results of shifting 
the entire achievement distribution, this scenario considers the implications of bringing 
up the bottom of the distribution. 
In order to understand the implications of changing just one portion of the achievement 
distribution, we employ the alternative estimation of the underlying economic growth 
models of column (2) of Table 5.  Specifically, instead of relying on just average 
cognitive skills in the growth models, the proportion of the population with scores less 
than 400 and the proportion with scores over 600 are included in the growth models.  
For these calculations, all OECD countries including Finland have room for 
improvement.  On average, 18 percent of students in the OECD countries score below 
400.  As might be expected from the average scores, the required improvements are 
largest in Mexico and Turkey (see column (9) of Table 7). 
Columns (6)-(8) of Table 7 display the economic outcomes according to historical 
growth patterns of bringing all OECD students up to minimum competence levels.  The 
overall OECD change would be an average annual growth rate that was 0.8 percent 
higher after reform was accomplished and after the full labor force had received the 
improved education.  The total improvements for the OECD countries from achieving 
universal minimum proficiency would have a present value of $226 trillion.  Again, 
there is a wide range of outcomes including relatively small improvements of 219 
percent of current GDP for Canada as compared to nine OECD countries that would 
experience a benefit more than five times their current GDP. 
The range of outcomes is depicted in Figure 6 that ranks countries by the benefits 
compared to current GDP.  Even Finland could by these calculations over double its 
current GDP through bringing the relatively modest proportion of low performers (4.7 
percent) up to scores of 400.  Note also that the effects of these policies on the separate 
countries differ from the previous scenario, reflecting the differences in the underlying 
distribution of student performance. 
5.3. An alternative neoclassical growth framework 
The projections so far assume that higher educational achievement allows a country to 
keep on growing at a higher rate in the long run.  Such a specification captures the basic 
ideas of endogenous growth theory, where a better-educated workforce leads to a larger 
stream of new ideas that produces technological progress at a higher rate (see Box 1 EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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above).  By contrast, in the augmented neoclassical growth model, changes in test scores 
lead to higher steady-state levels of income but do not affect the long-run growth path.  
Our empirical growth model captures the conditional convergence implied by the 
neoclassical model – but also by a set of endogenous growth models – through including 
the initial GDP level as a control variable.  An alternative approach for the projections is 
thus to interpret the model in the neoclassical rather than endogenous-growth framework 
and have educational reforms affect the steady-state level of income but not its long-run 
growth.  
To do so, we re-estimate our growth model with the logarithmic (rather than linear) 
per-capita GDP as control.  The test-score coefficient hardly changes in this specification 
(1.718 rather than 1.864), and the coefficient on log initial income is -1.835.  This 
estimated convergence rate of 1.8 percent is very close to the one expected under 
standard parameter assumptions in the augmented neoclassical growth model (Mankiw, 
Romer, and Weil (1992)).  It means that (approximating around the steady state) an 
economy moves halfway to its steady state in about 38 years.  Including this 
convergence process in our simulations allows us to perform projections that are in line 
with neoclassical growth theory.  In these projections, growth rates with and without 
education reform will differ only during the transition to the new balanced growth path.  
In the long run, the economy will grow at the same rate after the reform as without the 
reform.  
We use the estimates from this model to simulate the trajectory from the old to the new 
balanced growth path in each year during our time horizon.  To implement the idea that 
the world technological frontier grows at 1.5 percent in the absence of education reform 
in this model, we assume that in the aggregate the three countries with the largest shares 
of patents in the world – the United States, Japan, and Germany – grow at 1.5 percent 
without reform.  Together, the three countries currently account for over 70 percent of 
worldwide patents (measured in triadic patent families, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2008)).  We thus choose a constant growth parameter for 
each future year that has the weighted average of the three countries grow at 1.5 percent 
each year, where the weights are each country’s share in their combined GDP in the 
previous year.
21  
Table 8 shows the results of the projections based on the neoclassical model 
specification.  In reform Scenario I, where each country increases by 25 PISA points, the 
value of the reform – the discounted value of the future increases in GDP – amounts to 
$90 trillion in present value terms.  While this provides a neoclassical lower bound to 
our previous projection of $123 trillion, the noteworthy fact is that over the time horizon 
of our projections until 2090 (and for a reform that takes until 2070 to take full force in 
                                                           
21 We also experimented with alternative ways to implement the growth of the technological frontier, and results fall into the 
same ballpark.  The alternatives include holding the following growth rates constant at 1.5 percent: the (weighted) OECD 
average growth rate, the U.S. growth rate, a simple or weighted average of the U.S. and Finish growth rates, and a specification 
where “technological leadership” (as depicted in per-capita GDP) turns from the U.S. to Finland in the 2030s.  The latter 
specifications reflect the fact that Finland, the country with the highest test scores, is projected to have the highest steady-state 
level of per-capita GDP in our model.  Note that – consistent with such a model – in terms of patenting new technologies, 
Finland is currently already the country with the largest revealed technological advantage in ICT, as measured by ICT-related 
patents in total patents (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008)). EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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the workforce), the difference between the neoclassical and the endogenous growth 
model has relatively minor political meaning.  In either case, the value of the education 
reform is very large, at 288 percent or 211 percent of current OECD GDP.  Note that in 
the neoclassical projections, the value of this reform as a share of current GDP differs 
across countries, because the convergence term means that projected growth rates 
depend on the level of GDP reached.  
To illustrate the specific dynamics of the neoclassical projections, it is worth 
discussing a few details of the trajectories of the projection.  Initial growth rates (with or 
without reform) in 2010-11 differ across countries, depending on how far away they are 
from their steady state.  The United States is projected to grow at 1.1 percent initially, 
whereas the simple mean of OECD-country growth rates is higher at 1.9 percent due to 
many countries’ room for catch-up.
22  Due to the convergence process, average OECD-
country growth is down to 1.6 percent in 2090 without the reform, ranging from 1.0-1.8 
percent across countries.  With reform, the range is 1.2-2.0 percent, with an average of 
1.7 percent.  By 2104, the average is down to 1.5 percent, and by 2130, all countries’ 
growth rates have converged to between 1.3 and 1.6 percent without the reform and to 
1.4-1.7 percent with reform.   
In the neoclassical projections, the difference in average growth rates between the 
scenarios with and without reform grows to a maximum of 0.28 percentage points in 
about 2060 and then declines back to 0.18 percentage points in 2090 and 0.06 percentage 
points in 2150.  (Compare this to the endogenous growth model where the long-run 
growth rate stays 0.47 percentage points higher starting in 2070.)  By 2300, the 
difference in growth rates would be below 0.004 percentage points in each country.  
Thus, while the difference ultimately converges to zero, the model parameters imply that 
this convergence process takes a very long time to take full effect.  
In reform Scenario II, where each country improves to the test-score level of Finland, 
the present value of the reform amounts to $180 trillion in the neoclassical model, 
compared to the previous $275 trillion in the endogenous growth model – or more than 
four times (rather than six times) current GDP.  Note that this scenario implies that in the 
very long run, each country converges to the same steady-state level of per-capita GDP, 
as test scores are the only variable influencing the steady-state level in our model.   
However, in 2090 the per-capita GDP of the most advanced country would still be 70.6 
percent higher than that of the least advanced country.  By 2150, this difference would 
be down to 19.7 percent, and by 2300 to 1.2 percent.  
The present value of reform Scenario III, which brings all students to a minimum level 
of 400 PISA points, is $187 trillion in the neoclassical projections, rather than the $226 
trillion of the endogenous-growth type projections.
23  Again, the difference over our time 
                                                           
22 Based on our model which depicts only effects of test scores and reached levels of income, Luxembourg and Norway – the 
two countries with the highest current levels of GDP per capita – are projected to converge to a lower balanced growth path 
(both without and with reform) and thus initially have the lowest growth rates.  If these countries can keep their current 
advantage in per-capita relative to the other OECD countries in the future for reasons outside our model, this would increase 
the projected value of the educational reform in these countries. 
23 In the underlying growth regression with log per-capita GDP as control variable, the coefficient on the proportion of the 
population with scores higher than 400 is 6.478 and the coefficient on log initial income is -2.107 (both significant at the 1 
percent level). EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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horizon of projections is limited.  Across the three reform scenarios, the neoclassical 
projection value is between 65 and 83 percent of the endogenous-growth projection 
value.  
The difference between the two growth models depends on the time horizon chosen.  
The further out the projections are carried, the more substantial does the difference 
between the two growth models get.  The final four columns of Table 8 report the 
present value calculated with the estimated neoclassical version for reform Scenario II 
with time horizons varying between 2050 and 2150, respectively.  The varying time 
horizons clearly make a huge difference in the estimated returns to reform and illustrate 
how the neoclassical and endogenous growth specifications differ. Compared to the 
endogenous-growth projections evaluated over the same time horizons (discussed in 
Table 9 below), the neoclassical projection is 81 percent of the endogenous-growth 
projection value for a time horizon until 2050, 65 percent until 2090, and 44 percent 
until 2150.    
Several factors contribute to the closeness of the estimates over our time period for the 
impact of improvements in cognitive skills based on the two different growth models.  
First, our reform scenarios gradually introduce changes, due to the lags for the policy to 
become fully effective and for the new, better-educated workers to change the average 
skills of the labor force.  Our projections from the time after policies are fully felt 
involve just 20 years, a time too short to have huge differences in the implications of the 
alternative models.  Second, the biggest impacts of the differences across the alternative 
models occur in the distant future, and thus the impact is lessened by discounting to 
obtain present values and by disregarding any returns that might accrue after 2090.   
Third, even ignoring discounting, the estimated convergence parameters imply very long 
periods before any country returns to its balanced growth path following a perturbation 
because of policy.  Fourth, the present value of any reform keeps increasing even after 
full convergence has taken place and after growth returns to its pre-reform rates, because 
the economy is at a higher level due to the reform.  
As a consequence, for the (already long) time horizon taken here, the different 
dynamics of the neoclassical and endogenous growth model do not make a fundamental 
difference, regardless of whether human capital increases the long-run growth rate or 
not. The alternative set of neoclassical projections places a lower bound on the results 
based on the endogenous growth paradigm but retains the same order of magnitude.  
5.4. Sensitivity to alternative parameter choices 
The different scenarios indicate very large economic changes from educational 
improvement, but the estimates come for specific parametric choices.  How sensitive are 
the results to these specific choices?  We look at sensitivity in terms of reform Scenario 
II of bringing each country to the Finish level of PISA scores in our baseline 
endogenous-growth-type model specification.  The qualitative implications for changes 
in results, however, apply similarly for the other scenarios and growth model.   EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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Remember that in the baseline specification, the total value of the reform in the OECD 
amounts to $275 trillion, or 645 percent of the current GDP of OECD countries. 
The baseline model is based on the coefficient for education outcomes in the most 
general OECD growth regression framework, i.e., 1.864 percent of additional average 
annual growth for a one standard deviation increase in test scores (see column (2) of 
Table 2).  However, not least because of the limited sample size of the growth 
regressions, the precise estimate of the growth effect of a test score increase is an open 
issue.  Therefore, to see how sensitive the simulations are to alternative parameter 
assumptions for the growth coefficient, the first four columns of Table 9 perform the 
same projection calculations for the lowest and highest estimated parameters for 
cognitive skills in the different specifications of Table 2 – i.e., 1.398 and 1.968, 
respectively.  This leads to an estimate of the total discounted value of the education 
reform for the OECD of $196 trillion and $295 trillion, respectively (or 459% and 690%, 
respectively, of current GDP).  Thus, while these alternative parameter choices clearly 
make a difference, the bottom line of the projection analysis still is the same:  No matter 
which of the coefficient estimates is used, the aggregate value of the education reform is 
enormous.  
An alternative way to account for the imprecision of the growth coefficient estimate, 
reported in columns (5)-(8) of Table 9, is to use the lower and upper bounds, 
respectively, of the 95 percent confidence interval around the baseline growth coefficient 
in the underlying growth regression.  Results based on this analysis suggest that, with 95 
percent confidence, the net present value of the education reform is between $164 trillion 
and $406 trillion.  While these differences are economically significant, the ultimate 
conclusion remains:  Even at the bottom end of the confidence interval, the value of the 
reform still dwarfs any of the current stimulus packages by several orders of magnitude.  
Results so far incorporate any returns that accrue by the year 2090, but disregard any 
returns beyond that time horizon.  Columns (9)-(12) of Table 9 report the net present 
value to which the reform results aggregate for time horizons to the years 2050 and 
2150, respectively.  As already indicated by Figure 4, this clearly makes a huge 
difference.  When restricting the time horizon to 2050, the value of the reform is “only” 
$36 trillion, and such a horizon neglects much of the very huge long-run growth effects.  
This indicates how important it is to adopt a long-term horizon in order to see the full 
effects of any education reform.  Still, even by 2050, the net present value of the reform 
already accumulates to 85 percent of the current GDP of the OECD countries.  By 
contrast, when adopting a time horizon until 2150, the (appropriately discounted) value 
of the reform sums to a staggering $948 trillion, or more than 20 time the current GDP.  
The baseline scenarios assume that it takes 20 years for the education reform to be 
fully implemented.  The first four columns of Table 10 alternatively assume reform 
durations of 10 and 30 years, respectively.  The faster reform implementation leads to an 
increase of the reform value to $341 trillion, whereas the reform value is “only” $223 
trillion if the reform takes 30 years to implement.  Thus, while faster reform efforts 
obviously lead to substantially higher returns, even a slow (but successful) reform, if 
begun today, would have enormous impact.  EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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Columns (5) and (6) of Table 10 report results under the assumption that the average 
working life is 35 years, rather than 40 years, which appears to be a more reasonable 
estimate for many OECD countries.  A shorter working life means that the replacement 
of the workforce with better-educated individuals completes faster, so that the aggregate 
value of the education reform increases.  Assuming a 35 year work life yields a 
projection estimate of $304 trillion of the total value of the education reform.  
Finally, the rate at which future returns are discounted obviously makes a substantial 
difference for the net present value of a reform whose main returns do not start to pick 
for a whole generation.  Thus, rather than using the common-practice 3 percent discount 
rate of the baseline model, columns (7)-(10) of Table instead use discount rates of 2.5 
percent and 3.5 percent, respectively.  The resulting discounted present values of the 
projected returns are $369 trillion and $207 trillion, respectively.  Thus, the precise 
values of these long-run projections are clearly sensitive to the choice of the discount 
rate.  For a larger band of discount rate of 2 percent to 4 percent, the total discounted 
reform value would be $497 trillion and $157 trillion, respectively (not shown).   
However, other projections of long-run effects, in the area of climate change, have used 
much lower rates at which to discount the future.  In particular, the influential Stern 
Review report places a much higher value on future costs and benefits by employing a 
discount rate of only 1.4 percent (Stern (2007).
24  That report also assumes a slightly 
lower rate of potential growth of 1.3 percent (rather than 1.5 percent as in our other 
models), and this is used in our next estimate.  Note that what is ultimately relevant for 
the projections is the difference between discount rate and rate of potential growth, 
yielding an effective discount rate of 0.1 percent in this scenario.  If we were to adopt the 
discounting practice of the Stern report, the present value of the education reform would 
sum to a staggering $636 trillion, or roughly 15 times the current GDP, by 2090 (as 
reported in the final two columns of Table 10).  
The alternative projections under different parameter choices indicate that, while some 
of the parameter choices clearly have a big impact on the estimated reform value, even 
highly conservative parameter choices yield extremely large estimates of the aggregate 
value of the reform effects across the OECD. 
6. POLICIES TO IMPROVE EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT  
The previous discussion has stressed the importance of cognitive skills for economic 
growth.  The evidence indicates a strong impact of skills that can give rise to immense 
long-term benefits.  Table 11 summarizes the projection results for the three scenarios 
and two underlying models under the baseline parameterization.  Normalized against the 
discounted value of the projected future GDP of the OECD over the same time span 
(until 2090), the value of the reform amounts to 4.3-13.8 percent of the present value of 
future GDP.  Independent on whether the underlying economic model is specified in 
                                                           
24 Note that this alternative discount rate is highly disputed in the economics literature (e.g., Nordhaus (2007); Tol and Yohe 
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endogenous-growth or neoclassical terms, improved educational achievement is 
projected to have a large impact on future economic well-being of OECD countries.  
Yet simply knowing that skill differences are important does not provide a guide to 
policies that might promote more skills.  Indeed, a wide variety of policies have been 
implemented within various countries without much evidence of success in either 
achievement or economic terms.  We believe that the disappointing results of the past 
generally reflect pursuing policies for which there is little empirical support.  
Substantial research has gone into understanding why achievement differs across 
students and across countries.  While controversies have existed about the interpretation 
of various individual pieces of evidence, considerable agreement now exists about what 
kinds of approaches are unreliable avenues for change.  There is perhaps less agreement 
on the precise approaches that might be followed, but even here there is a growing 
consensus about the general sets of policies that have shown promise based on more 
credible research approaches. 
The work on achievement determinants generally falls under the heading “education 
production functions.”  The extensive work has taken a variety of perspectives and 
approaches.  The general objective is to sort out the causal impacts of school factors 
(things that can potentially be manipulated through policy) from other influences on 
achievement including family background, peers, neighborhood influences, and the like 
(which are less readily amenable to policy change).  In this section, we discuss available 
evidence on the potential for different aspects of school policy – in particular, those 
focused on school resource, teacher quality, and institutional structures –to improve 
educational achievement significantly. 
6.1. Evidence on school resources 
The most extensive generally available evidence relates to the effects of resources.  
Many policies undertaken involve substantial flows of resources – direct spending, 
changes in teacher salaries, reductions in class size, and the like – made within the 
context of current school organization.  The empirical evidence clearly documents the 
difficulties with such policies.  Simply providing more resources gives, according to the 
available evidence, little assurance that student performance will improve significantly.  
The underlying analyses of resources include studies within individual countries and 
across different countries and have been extensively reviewed elsewhere (see Hanushek 
(2003); Woessmann (2007a); Hanushek and Woessmann (2010)). 
The easiest way to see the situation is a simple cross-country picture.  Figure 7 plots 
the descriptive association between educational expenditure per student and educational 
outcomes for recent OECD achievement tests, the PISA 2006 study.  Ignoring Mexico 
and Turkey where cumulative expenditure per student (over the age range of 6 to 15 EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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years) of less than $20,000, there is no association between educational spending and 
educational outcomes across OECD countries.
25   
Table 12 probes the cross-country expenditure-outcome relationship in education in 
greater detail.  Columns (1) to (6) reveal that in all three cycles of the OECD PISA 
student achievement test – 2000, 2003, and 2006 – there is a very small positive 
bivariate association between expenditure per student and educational achievement that 
vanishes once countries below a very basic cumulative spending level of $25,000 are 
excluded.  In fact, in the latter samples, the adjusted R
2 of a regression of test scores on 
educational expenditure per student is actually negative in all three PISA cycles.  Of 
course, many more factors such as students’ family backgrounds enter the determination 
of educational outcomes.   
The simplest way of addressing bias from unobserved time-invariant country factors is 
to ignore level differences and restrict the analysis to changes in expenditure and 
outcomes over time.  Thus, column (7) reports a regression in first differences between 
2006 and 2000, and column (8) reports a fixed-effects regression that pools all three 
PISA cycles.  In both cases, the association between expenditure per student and 
educational outcomes is far from being statistically significant at conventional levels, 
and the point estimates are actually negative.  These descriptive patterns suggest that 
additional resources are not related systematically to improved test scores.
26  
For policy deliberations, information on the impact of resources from within individual 
countries is perhaps more appropriate than cross-country information.  Researchers have 
studied the determinants of student achievement for more than 40 years.  The work was 
begun in the United States in the “Coleman Report” (Coleman et al. (1966)), which 
introduced the idea of using statistical analysis to relate various inputs of schools to 
student outcomes.  This work also underscored the importance of including non-school 
factors by demonstrating that family differences were very important in explaining 
variations in achievement across students.  While this original study has been subjected 
to considerable criticism, it led to an extensive line of research.  
The general picture about school resources in developed countries is now well known 
and has been reviewed in a variety of places (see Woessmann (2005a) for Europe and 
Hanushek (2002, 2003) for the United States).  The available studies concentrate on 
various common inputs to schools such as teacher experience or class size.  These 
factors are both readily available in both administrative and survey data sets and 
frequently identified as the focus of policy.  The available econometric evidence now 
includes literally hundreds of separate estimates within the U.S. and other developed 
countries.  Quite uniformly, however, there is little strong evidence that any of the 
                                                           
25 With the two outliers, there is a weak positive association as long as other effects are ignored.  Taken literally, the gray 
regression line that includes Mexico and Turkey depicts an association where a doubling of expenditure in these two countries 
is associated with one tenth of a standard deviation in test scores.  Note that the test score-growth nexus reported above was 
robust to dropping these two countries from the growth analysis. 
26 These results also address the concern with the growth analyses reported above that there may be a simple simultaneous 
determination of schooling investments and economic growth.  Specifically, if a nation becomes richer through growth, it 
might put more resources into its schools so as to increase its cognitive skills.  However, the current results show that such 
expenditure increases are not associated with educational outcomes in the first place.  Consequently, additional resources in the 
school system are unlikely to generate important reverse causality from growth to test scores.  EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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following factors has a consistent impact on achievement:  the level of teacher education, 
the pupil-teacher ratio, the characteristics of administration, or the facilities of the 
school.  Specifically, aggregating results across studies, a minority of estimates are 
statistically different from zero (at the 5 percent level or better), and the studies do not 
even uniformly indicate improvements in performance with increased resources.  A 
second line of studies focuses on financial inputs.  A number of studies simply relate 
spending per student to achievement or capture teacher differences by teacher salaries.  
While these studies tend to be lower quality, they also fail to show a consistent 
relationship between financial resources and achievement. 
These results have been controversial.  A variety of debates have taken place around 
the correct interpretation of prior work (see, for example, Burtless (1996)).  The most 
important line of debate has involved study quality and whether or not these works 
adequately control for various inputs that might complicate the interpretation of 
resources.  For example, the statistical models may not adequately account for other 
inputs that affect achievement such as the quality of family inputs.  The estimates might 
then erroneously attribute the higher achievement due to better family factors to some of 
the characteristics of schools. 
A simplistic view of this argument – convenient as a straw man in public debates – is 
that ‘money never matters.’
27  The research of course does not say that.  Nor does it say 
that ‘money cannot matter.’  It simply underscores the fact that there has historically 
been a set of decisions and incentives in schools that have blunted any impacts of added 
funds, leading to inconsistent outcomes.  That is, more spending on schools has not led 
reliably to substantially better results. 
6.2. Teacher quality 
The most current research on school inputs and achievement has also led to another set 
of conclusions – that teacher quality is enormously important in determining student 
achievement.  This work has concentrated on whether some teachers consistently 
produce more gains in student achievement than other teachers.
28  Working with 
extensive panel data on individual students from different U.S. states, these studies have 
confirmed large differences among teachers in terms of outcomes in the classroom.  
But, they have also shown that the observed differences are not closely related to 
commonly observed characteristics of teachers (such as amount of teacher education).  
Some attributes of teachers – such as having one or two years of experience – have 
explained part of the differences in teacher quality, but these factors are a small part of 
the overall variance in teacher results.
29  This inability to identify specific teacher 
                                                           
27 For the historical framing of the question, see the exchange between Greenwald, Hedges, and Laine (1996) and Hanushek 
(1996). 
28 See, for example, Hanushek (1971, 1992), Rockoff (2004), Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005), and a number of subsequent 
studies reviewed in Hanushek and Rivkin (2010). 
29 There is some indication that teachers’ own academic skills measured by scores on achievement tests may be an important 
factor (see Wayne and Youngs (2003), Eide, Goldhaber, and Brewer (2004), and Hanushek and Rivkin (2006) for reviews), but 
methodologically more sophisticated work is needed before conclusive assessments can be given on this dimension.  EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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qualities makes it difficult to regulate or legislate having high-quality teachers in 
classrooms.  It also contributes to our conclusions below that changes in the institutional 
structure and incentives of schools are fundamental to improving school outcomes.  
6.3. Institutional structures and incentives in the school system  
Similar to the importance of economic institutions for national economies, it is 
difficult to have a highly functioning education system without a supportive institutional 
structure.  On this matter, however, there are more different opinions and perhaps a 
wider divergence in outcomes.  Part of the reason for the divergent opinions is simply a 
lack of sufficient experience, analysis, and evidence.  
The evidence does suggest some clear general policies that are important.  Foremost 
among these, the performance of a system is affected by the incentives that actors face.  
That is, if the actors in the education process are rewarded (extrinsically or intrinsically) 
for producing better student achievement, and if they are penalized for not producing 
high achievement, achievement is likely to improve.  The incentives to produce high-
quality education, in turn, are created by the institutions of the education system – the 
rules and regulations that explicitly or implicitly set rewards and penalties for the people 
involved in the education process.  Therefore, one might expect that institutional features 
have important impacts on student learning.  
The unifying theme of these institutional studies is that the key to improvement 
appears to lie in better incentives – incentives that will lead to managerial decisions 
keyed to student achievement and that will promote strong schools with high-quality 
teachers.  Here, three interrelated policies come to the forefront:  promoting more 
competition, so that parental demand will create strong incentives to individual schools; 
autonomy in local decision making, so that individual schools and their leaders will take 
actions to promote student achievement; and, an accountability system that identifies 
good school performance and leads to rewards based on this. 
Choice and Competition.  Choice and competition in schools were proposed a half 
century ago by Milton Friedman (1962).  The simple idea is that parents, interested in 
the schooling outcomes of their children, will seek out productive schools.  This 
demand-side pressure will result in incentives for each school to produce an effective 
education system.  These incentives will also put pressure on schools to ensure high-
quality staff in addition to a good curriculum.  
In many school systems (with the Netherlands being the most obvious example), a 
number of privately managed schools provide alternatives for students.  These schools, 
which also often have a religious affiliation, are part of the natural institutional 
framework.  Unfortunately, little thorough evaluation has been done of the choice 
possibilities, in large part because there is no obvious comparison group (i.e., choice is 
instituted for an entire country and there is no example of the no-choice alternative).  In 
a cross-country comparison, students in countries with a larger share of privately 
managed schools tend to perform better on average (cf. Woessmann (2007b, 2009); EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, and West (2009)), and recent evidence corroborates 
the conclusion that this is due to a causal effect of private-sector competition (West and 
Woessmann (2010)).
30  
In the U.S., there are limited examples of private school choice, ranging from the 
publicly funded school vouchers in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Washington, DC, to 
privately financed voucher alternatives.
31  The evaluations of these generally show that 
the choice schools do at least as well as the regular public schools, if not better (see 
Rouse (1998); Howell and Peterson (2002)).
32   
In Europe, Bradley and Taylor (2002) and Levačić (2004) find similar positive effects 
of school competition on the performance of English schools.  Sandström and Bergström 
(2005) and Björklund, Edin, Freriksson, and Krueger (2004) provide evidence on 
significant positive effects of competition from privately operated schools on the 
performance of public schools in Sweden.  Filer and Münich (2003) show that the 
introduction of a voucher-type system in the Czech Republic led to the creation of 
private schools in areas where public schools are doing badly and that the public schools 
facing private competition improved their performance.  
The major issue on choice and competition is still the limited experience.  Teachers 
unions and administrator groups invariable dislike the idea of competition – because it 
puts pressure on them.  Thus, not many examples of operational, large-scale attempts at 
competition have been evaluated.  
Autonomy and Decentralization.  Several institutional features of a school system can 
be grouped under the heading of autonomy or decentralization, including local decision 
making on different matters, fiscal decentralization, and parental involvement.  Almost 
any system of improved incentives for schools depends upon having school personnel in 
individual schools and districts heavily involved in decision making.  It is difficult to 
compile evidence on the impact of autonomy, because the degree of local decision 
making is most generally a decision for a country (or state) as a whole, leaving no 
comparison group within countries.  Across countries, students tend to perform better in 
schools that have autonomy in personnel and day-to-day decisions (Woessmann (2003a, 
2007b); Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, and West (2009)), in particular when there is 
accountability (see also the review in Hanushek and Woessmann (2010)).  
The U.S. states have varying amounts of local autonomy.  One systematic form of 
school autonomy is “charter schools,” which are public schools that are allowed to 
perform quite autonomously. (Note that these are actually hybrids of choice schools and 
public-school autonomy, because they survive only if sufficient numbers of students are 
attracted to them and continue to attend them).  These schools are relatively new, a fact 
                                                           
30 Note that private school management does not mean private school funding; the international evidence suggests that both 
private school management and public school funding are associated with better achievement across countries (Woessmann 
(2009)).  
31 The largest U.S. voucher program in the State of Florida provides vouchers for special needs students (Greene (2007)).  
While there is considerable satisfaction with this program, there is no evaluation available that is based on explicit outcome 
measures. 
32 A special type of choice in the U.S. is charter schools.  These schools are discussed next under autonomy.  Also, given U.S. 
residential mobility, individual public school districts compete with each other, and more competition appears to produce 
better results (Hoxby (2000)), although this finding has been controversial (Rothstein (2007); Hoxby (2007)). EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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that complicates evaluation since many are still in the start-up phase.  The evidence on 
them is mixed but indicates a variety of places where charter schools outperform the 
regular public schools after the initial start-up phase but also suggests in part that the 
regulations governing them and the particular competitive public schools they face have 
an influence.
33  
Given the available evidence, support for autonomy also strongly rests on a conceptual 
basis.  A system with strong incentives seems likely to capitalize on local decision 
making. 
School Accountability.  Many countries around the world have been moving toward 
increased accountability of local schools for student performance.  The United Kingdom 
has developed an elaborate system of “league tables” designed to give parents full 
information about the performance of local schools.  The United States has legislated a 
federal law (“No Child Left Behind”) that all states develop an accountability system 
that meets certain general guidelines.  It also sets into law a series of actions required 
when a school fails to bring sufficient numbers of students up to proficiency in core 
subjects. 
Evidence on the impacts of these systems has begun to accumulate.  While there is 
some uncertainty given the newness of the overall federal accountability system 
(introduced in 2002), the best U.S. evidence indicates that strong state accountability 
systems in fact lead to better student performance (Carnoy and Loeb (2002); Hanushek 
and Raymond (2005); Jacob (2005); Dee and Jacob (2009)). 
One institutional set-up that combines accountability with parental choice are systems 
that give students in schools that repeatedly do badly on the accountability test a voucher 
to attend private schools.  In Florida, the threat of becoming subject to private-school 
choice if failing on the test has been shown to increase school performance particularly 
for disadvantaged students (West and Peterson (2006); Figlio and Rouse (2006)).  
Curriculum-based external exit exams are another means to introduce some form of 
accountability into the schooling system.  They provide performance information which 
can hold both students and schools accountable.  Students in countries with external exit 
exam systems tend to systematically outperform students in countries without such 
systems (Bishop (1997, 2006); Woessmann (2003a, 2007b); Woessmann, Luedemann, 
Schuetz, and West (2009)).  In Canada and Germany, the two national education systems 
where the existence of external exams varies within the country because some regions 
feature them and others not,  it has similarly been shown that students perform better in 
regions with external exams (Bishop (1997); Jürges, Schneider, and Büchel (2005); 
Woessmann (2010b)).  
It is difficult to imagine choice or autonomy working well without a good system of 
student testing and accountability.  Thus, the ideas about institutional structure are 
                                                           
33 A number of studies have based the analysis on student fixed effects, relying on students moving in and out of charter 
schools to identify the impact of charters (Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, and Jansen (2007); Bifulco and Ladd (2006); 
Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin, and Branch (2007)).  These studies have generally pointed to a range of quality for charter schools 
but highlight start-up problems.  Another set of studies considers charter schools that have more demand than open positions, 
requiring schools to choose their students by lottery (Hoxby and Murarka (2009); Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2009)).  Finally, 
matching methods have been used to compare public and private school performance, leading to the conclusion that there is 
wide variation in the quality of charter schools compared to the relevant public schools (CREDO (2009, 2010)). EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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closely linked together.  The international evidence clearly suggests that school 
autonomy, in particular local autonomy over teacher salaries and course content, is only 
effective in school systems that have external exams in place (Woessmann (2005b, 
2007b); Fuchs and Woessmann (2007); Woessmann, Luedemann, Schuetz, and West 
(2009)).  For example, school autonomy over teacher salaries is negatively associated 
with student achievement in systems without external exams, but positively associated 
with student achievement in external-exam systems.  This pattern of results has been 
found in several different TIMSS and PISA studies and in analyses of autonomy in other 
decision making areas such as school autonomy in determining course content and 
teacher influence on resource funding.  Similar evidence that accountability policies are 
more effective when there is greater local control has also been found across U.S. states 
(Loeb and Strunk (2007)). 
Finally, given the importance of high teacher quality, a promising candidate for 
improvement is the specific form of accountability that aims incentives directly at 
teachers.  While convincing evidence on the effects of performance-related teacher pay 
is scarce, the more rigorous studies in terms of empirical identification tend to find a 
positive relationship between financial teacher incentives and student outcomes (cf. the 
surveys in Atkinson et al. (2009) and Podgursky and Springer (2007); see also Figlio and 
Kenny (2007)).  Thus, Atkinson et al. (2009) find that the introduction of performance-
related pay had a substantial positive impact on student achievement in England.
  
Similarly, monetary incentives for teachers based on their students’ performance have 
been shown to improve student learning very significantly in Israel and in India (Lavy 
(2002, 2009); Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2009)).  Likewise, the cross-country 
variation provides some indication that students perform better in countries that allow for 
teacher salaries to be adjusted based on performance in teaching (Woessmann (2010a)).  
Clearly, research on how school policy can successfully advance educational 
achievement is an expanding field that still leaves many open questions.  At the same 
time, our reading of the available evidence is that institutional reforms – in particular in 
the areas of competition, autonomy, and accountability – that create incentives for 
improving outcomes and focus in particular on teacher quality have substantial potential 
to create the kinds of learning gains that our results above show to be linked to immense 
long-term economic benefits.  
7. CONCLUSIONS 
It is generally the case that national attention to economic policies that deal with 
current aggregate demand conditions and with business cycles invariably take priority 
over longer-run policy considerations.  Perhaps this has never been as true as today, 
when the most obvious focus of attention is the worldwide recession.  Without 
minimizing the need to deal with current unemployment conditions, the message of this 
paper is that considering issues of longer-run economic growth may be more important 
for the welfare of nations.  Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas, in his presidential address to 
the American Economic Association, concluded that “Taking US performance over the EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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past 50 years as a benchmark, the potential for welfare gains from better long-run, 
supply-side policies exceeds by far the potential from further improvements in short-run 
demand management.” (Lucas (2003))  
Our results show that education policy is closely associated with the long-run growth 
potentials of OECD countries.  The regression analyses suggest that direct measures of 
educational outcomes, in terms of cognitive skills on international achievement tests, 
emerge as the one strong policy factor underlying growth differences across OECD 
countries.  By contrast, a long battery of institutional and regulatory measures does not 
add to an explanation of the substantial differences in long-run growth rates that exist 
across OECD countries, mainly because all OECD countries share a common set of 
basic institutional structures that ensure a general functioning of market economies.   
Considering different skill dimensions, basic skills are robustly related to OECD-country 
growth, whereas the relation of the top-skill dimension with growth is at least 
substantially smaller than in non-OECD countries.  When cognitive skills are accounted 
for, tertiary attainment is not significantly associated with long-run growth differences 
across OECD countries.  
Our projection analysis suggests that, under plausible parameter assumptions, the real 
present value of future improvements in GDP due to challenging but achievable 
educational reform scenarios amounts to $90-275 trillion.  A modest goal of having all 
OECD countries boost their average PISA scores by 25 points (one-quarter standard 
deviation) implies an aggregate gain of OECD GDP of $90-123 trillion dollars.  More 
aggressive goals, such as bringing all students to a level of minimal proficiency for the 
OECD or bringing all OECD countries to the level reached by Finland today, would 
imply aggregate GDP increases beyond $200 trillion according to historical growth 
relationships.  The precise size of the reform value of such long-run projections is clearly 
up for debate.  Nevertheless, our sensitivity analyses indicate that, while differences 
between an endogenous and neoclassical model framework and alternative parameter 
choices clearly make a difference, the estimates of the long-run effect of reasonable 
education reforms still yield enormous values no matter what.  The gains from education 
reform far exceed the level of stimulus funds in the current global recession.  
Our projections do not by themselves indicate how schools should be changed.  Nor do 
they solve the political economy issues of how any change should be achieved 
politically.  They simply underscore the high cost of political inaction or misdirection.   
In order to provide some guidance, we review the extensive relevant research on the 
determinants of educational achievement.  Several conclusions appear.  First, many of 
the traditional policies of simply providing more funds for schools or of adding specific 
resources such as smaller classes do not provide much hope for significant 
improvements in student achievement.  Second, a growing body of research shows that 
teacher quality is a primary driver of student achievement but that differences in quality 
are not closely related to teacher education and experience.  Because teacher quality is 
not easily measured and regulated, effective policies to improve quality appear to 
necessitate more careful attention to the incentives faced by schools and teachers.  Here 
the research on educational institutions suggests productive policy approaches.  In EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
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particular, evidence from both within and across countries points to the positive impact 
of competition among schools, of accountability and student testing, and of local school 
autonomy in decision making.
34  Research on these policies, separately and in 
combination, indicates some continuing uncertainty about the magnitude of any effects 
but does support more aggressive attention to these in setting school policies. 
An important aspect highlighted by the projections is the dynamic nature of human 
capital and growth.  Our basic characterization of growth indicates that higher cognitive 
skills offer a path of continued economic improvement, so that favorable policies today 
have growing impacts in the future.  However, the full ramifications of schooling 
outcomes will not become apparent until reasonably far into the future.  The economic 
gains from education reform are surely not reaped within matters of one or two political 
legislation periods.  They rather require a long-run perspective that fully considers the 
time horizon of a child born today.  In the discussion of climate policies, it has become 
custom to consider expected outcomes that materialize several generations from now.  
Education policy needs a similar long-term perspective to fully capture the consequences 
of possible current reforms.  
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Figure 1.  GDP per capita in OECD countries in 1960 and 2000 
Notes: GDP per capita in constant international dollars, 24 OECD countries with income and 
education data for the whole period.  Colors for expositional purposes only.  
 Source: Authors’ depiction based on data from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). 
 
 
Figure 2.  Educational performance and economic growth across OECD countries 
Notes: Added-variable plot of a regression of the average annual rate of growth (in percent) of 
real GDP per capita in 1960-2000 on the initial level of real GDP per capita in 1960, average test 
scores on international student achievement tests, and average years of schooling in 1960 (mean 
of the unconditional variables added to each axis). 




Figure 3.  Quantile regression estimates 
Notes: The straight line represents quantile regression estimates in 5-percent steps of the 
coefficient on test scores in a model corresponding to column (2) of Table 2.  The shaded area 
shows the 90-percent confidence interval of the quantile regression estimates.  The horizontal 
dashed line represents the OLS estimate and the dotted line its 90-percent confidence interval.  









































Figure 4.  Improvement in annual GDP with Scenario I (increase everyone by ¼ std. dev.) 
Notes: GDP with reform relative to GDP without reform in each year after the reform starts.  Main line:  
point estimate of Scenario I.  Gray dotted lines:  95% confidence interval of the point estimate of the 
growth regression. 














































































































































































































































































Figure 5.  Present value of Scenario II (bring each country to Finish level) in percent of current GDP 
Notes: Discounted value of future increases in GDP until 2090 due to a reform that brings each country to the Finish 
average level of 546 PISA points, expressed as percentage of current GDP.  Value is 2389% for Mexico and 1844% for 
Turkey. 






































































































































































































































































Figure 6.  Present value of Scenario III (bring everyone up to minimum skills) in percent of current 
GDP 
Notes: Discounted value of future increases in GDP until 2090 due to a reform that brings every individual in the country 
up to a minimum skill level of 400 PISA points, expressed as percentage of current GDP.  Value is 1794% for Mexico 
and 1430% for Turkey.  








Figure 7.  Educational spending and student achievement across countries 
Notes: The figure plots the average math achievement in PISA 2006 against cumulative expenditure 
on educational institutions per student between age 6 and 15, in US dollars, converted by 
purchasing power parities.  Gray line:  regression line for full sample.  Black line: regression line 
for countries with expenditure above $20,000. 
Source: Authors’ depiction based on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007).  
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